3. That a panel of masters be appointed, as authorized in Article 17(e) of the Charter, to examine applications and to report those that are insufficient on their own statements and to go to the camps and supervise the taking of any relevant evidence. Defense Counsel and Prosecution representatives should, of course, attend and be heard before the masters. The masters should reduce any evidence to deposition form and report the whole to this Tribunal, to be introduced as a part of its record.

4. The representative principle may also be employed to simplify the task. Members of particular organizations in particular camps might well be invited to choose one or more to represent them in presenting evidence.

It may not be untimely to remind the Tribunal and the Defense Counsel that the Prosecution has omitted from evidence many relevant documents which show repetition of crimes by these organizations in order to save time by avoiding cumulative evidence. It is not too much to expect that cumulative evidence of a negative character will likewise be limited.

Some concern has been expressed as to the number of persons who might be affected by the declarations of criminality which we have asked.

Some people seem more susceptible to the shock of a million punishments than to shock from 5 million murders. At most the number of punishments will never catch up with the number of crimes. However, it is impossible to state, even with approximate accuracy, the number of persons who might be affected by the declaration of criminality which we have asked.

Figures from the German sources seriously exaggerate the number, because they do not take account of heavy casualties in the latter part of the war, and make no allowance for duplication of membership which was large. For example, the evidence is to the effect that 75 percent of the Gestapo men also were members of the SS. We know that the United States forces have a roughly estimated 130,000 detained persons who appear to be members of accused organizations. I have no figure from other Allied forces. But how many of these actually would be prosecuted, instead of being dealt with under the denazification program, no one can foretell. Whatever the number, of one thing we may be sure: It is so large that a thorough inquiry by this Tribunal into each case would prolong its session beyond endurance. All questions as to whether individuals or subgroups of accused organizations should be excepted from the declaration of criminality should be left for local courts, located near the home of the accused and near the source of evidence. The courts can work in one or at most in two languages, instead of four, and can hear evidence which both parties direct to the specific issues.

This is not the time to review the evidence against each particular organization which, we take it, should be reserved for summation after the evidence is all presented. But it is timely to say that the selection of the six organizations named in the Indictment was not a matter of chance. The chief reasons they were chosen are these: Collectively they were the ultimate repositories of all power in the Nazi regime; they were not only the most powerful, but the most vicious organizations in the regime; and they were organizations in which membership was generally voluntary.

The Nazi Leadership Corps consisted of the directors and principal executors of the Nazi Party, and the Nazi Party was the force lying behind and dominating the whole German State. The Reich Cabinet was the facade through which the Nazi Party translated its will into legislative, administrative, and executive acts. The two pillars on which the security of the regime rested were the Armed Forces, directed and controlled by the General Staff and High Command, and the police forces—the Gestapo, the SA, the SD, and the SS. These organizations exemplify all the evil forces of the Nazi regime.

These organizations were also selected because, while representative, they were not so large or extensive as to make it probable that innocent, passive, or indifferent Germans might be caught up in the same net with the guilty. State officialdom is represented, but not all the administrative officials or department heads or civil servants; only the Reich Cabinet, the very heart of Nazidom within the government, is named. The Armed Forces are accused, but not the average soldier or officer, no matter how high-ranking. Only the top policy makers—the General Staff and the High Command—are named. The police forces are accused—but not every policeman, not the ordinary police which performed only the normal police functions. Only the most terroristic and repressive police elements—the Gestapo and SD—are named. The Nazi Party is accused—but not every Nazi voter, not even every member, only the leaders. And not even every Party official or worker is included; only “the bearers of sovereignty,” in the metaphysical jargon of the Party, who were the actual commanding officers and their staff officers on the highest levels.

I think it is important that we observe, in reference to the Nazi Party, just what it is that we are doing here and compare it with the denazification program in effect without any declaration of criminality, in order to see in its true perspective the indictment which we bring against the Nazi Party.