DR. KUBUSCHOK: Before the recess I referred to a suggestion for getting information about the actions and the attitude of the members by means of typical facts. I continue.
This taking of evidence would have, for practical purposes, to extend to a sufficient number of camps in all the zones of occupation. From the results of this taking of evidence a conclusion could then be drawn, on the basis of what is found to be typical, as to the criminal activity and attitude of the individual member of the organization, and at the same time, a conclusion as to whether or not the organization had a criminal nature.
If the Prosecution are in agreement with the Defense so far, I believe that I have perhaps found in this way a means of collecting the relevant evidence, including all positive and negative elements.
To whatever extent the hearing of inmates of camps does not suffice, which might be true of the one organization or the other, the hearing of members of the organization who are not in custody might have to be considered. Here, too, a proper way could probably be found which would likewise make possible and easier the execution of the tasks of the Tribunal.
DR. SERVATIUS: I, too, should like to take a stand on the questions now being discussed before the Court. I am not at present in a position to take a stand on the profound and well-presented statements which Justice Jackson has made here. I should not like to make a brief and less carefully thought-out answer, but the Court will understand that I and a number of my colleagues desire to put our case after studying the material and the laws. Perhaps the Tribunal will give us the opportunity to do this very shortly.
I should like now to take a stand on these questions along more technical lines, in order to fulfill my duty and on behalf of the Defense to take a clear stand on these clear questions.
In the first question it was asked what evidence is to be admitted and what particular evidence should be presented here in the main trial before this Tribunal.
The answer is this, that all evidence is relevant which is of significance for the determination of criminality. If one examines the concept “criminal” it is seen that there is no factual situation as defined by criminal law, nor can there be any, for it is not a question of determining the factual elements but rather of a judgment as to whether an act is criminal in the same way as judgment as to whether something is good or bad. Consequently, the Charter does not oblige the Tribunal to pass sentence and declare such-and-such to be criminal, but rather it states that the Tribunal “may” pass such a sentence, but not that it “must” reach such a decision.
It can thus be seen that the Tribunal is here confronted with a task which is basically different from the activity of a judge. A judge is obliged, when certain facts determined by law are put before him, to pass sentence, but this Tribunal is to determine the culpability of a set of facts, on the basis of which the judge will later pass sentence.
Such a task is, however, that of a legislator and not of a judge. The Tribunal here determines what is deserving of punishment and thereby creates a law. In this way the Tribunal also creates that basis for the procedure which Justice Jackson mentioned in a former address of his—the basis for procedure in the subsequent individual trials.