DR. STAHMER: Did you play any part in the attack on Rotterdam?
KESSELRING: As Air Force Chief 2, to which rank I had been promoted, I led air attacks on Holland, Belgium, and France, and the airborne corps operated under my command also. The airborne corps was commanded by General Student, who asked for his paratroops to be supported by a bomber attack. General Student had such a comprehensive knowledge of the ground situation that he alone must be considered responsible for preparation and execution of the attack. The Fourth Air Corps was ordered to provide air support, and one group, the smallest unit necessary for this purpose, was employed. The attack was carried out solely in accordance with the tactical requirements and technical possibilities. The orders of General Student reached my command very early. Thus all preparations could be made leisurely according to plan. At the instance of the Reich Marshal the unit was informed of possible changes within Rotterdam and of the approach of Panzer divisions. The objective set by General Student was quite clear as to extent, central and key points, and occupation. It was not difficult for seasoned troops to grasp the objective. There was radio communication between General Student’s command, my staff, and other staffs, including the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe. Any interruption of this communication could only have been a very short one as radio orders were transmitted by me or the Reich Marshal. The technique at that time made it possible to maintain contact through this radio communication between the tactical ground station and the flying unit, via its ground station. The ground communications usual at that time such as flags, flares, and signal code designations at the front were maintained according to plan. They functioned without a hitch. In accordance with its training and its orders the formation had sent out a reconnaissance aircraft which kept them informed of the situation and the objective. In addition, by order of the Reich Marshal, there followed a General Staff officer attached to my air fleet who had the same mission.
DR. STAHMER: Had the order been given that the situation and the objective should be . . .
KESSELRING: I myself never had any doubt that the attack had to be carried out; I was only not quite sure whether or not it should be repeated. And this was the question to which the signals referred. Judging from my knowledge of General Student and—I stress this particularly—his technique in leading an attack and his clearly stated requirements, I had to expect the attack to be carried out.
The attack was carried out according to plan and time schedule. The report that the target had been accurately bombed came through very quickly together with the message that no further attacks were necessary. During the 3 days of fighting in Holland the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe was kept well informed. Particularly on the third day, that is, the day I am talking of, the Reich Marshal in his outspoken manner intervened more than usual in the direction of the air fleet and did, in my opinion, everything that could possibly be done from such a high position. I do not remember any message to the effect that the bomber attack was no longer warranted by the tactical situation.
DR. STAHMER: Bombs are said to have been dropped when negotiations about capitulation had already started.
KESSELRING: As I said, no message to this effect had been received by the command, neither had the formation operating over Rotterdam picked up a message from the ground. Probably some confusion occurred at the command in Rotterdam itself of which I know nothing. Neither do I know about the agreements reached between General Student and the officer commanding the Dutch troops in Rotterdam. I wanted later to have a talk with General Student on this question, but it was not possible because of his having received a serious head injury. If, contrary to my firm conviction, the attack had been no longer warranted by the situation, this would be most regrettable. As a soldier of 42 years’ standing, as an artillery man, as an airman, as a General Staff officer, and as a leader for many years, I wish to make it clear that this case was one of those unforeseeable coincidences of war which, I am sorry to say, occur in the armed services of all countries more frequently than one might think; only the world does not know.
DR. STAHMER: How do you explain the big fires that still broke out in Rotterdam?
KESSELRING: When I received the report from the formation I was very pleasantly surprised to learn that the effect of the bombing was confined to the target area, but this war has shown that most of the destruction is not caused by the bombs themselves, but by the spreading of fires. Unfortunately a bomb had hit a margarine or some other factory in Rotterdam, causing oil to run out and the fire to spread. As after the attack the capitulation was already effective, it should have been possible to prevent the fires from spreading by bringing in the fire services and the troops.
DR. STAHMER: What were the military consequences of this attack?