THE PRESIDENT: Particularly as he said he cannot remember.
DR. LATERNSER: I withdraw the question.
Witness, can you quote other cases where the Commando Order was not applied in your area?
KESSELRING: Small scale landings behind the lines at Commazzio, south of Venice, also airborne landings north of Albenda in the region of Genoa and minor actions in the Lago di Ortona district. I am convinced the troops adopted this general view and acted accordingly.
DR. LATERNSER: You were commander-in-chief of an air fleet in the East. What can you say about the treatment of the Russian civilian population during the campaign?
KESSELRING: I was in Russia until the end of November and I can say only that the population and the troops were on the best of terms, and that the field kitchens were used everywhere for the benefit of the poor and the children; also that the morality of the Russian woman, which, as is known, is on a high level, was respected by the German soldiers to a remarkable extent. I know that my doctors, during the hours of attendance, were frequently consulted by the Russian population. I remember this, because the doctors spoke to me about the fortitude they showed in enduring pain. The war passed so quickly over the plains as far as Smolensk that the whole area presented quite a peaceful aspect; peasants were at work, fairly large herds of cattle were grazing, and when I visited the area I found the small dwellings intact.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you hear of any excesses committed by German soldiers in the East? Whenever cases of violations of international law were reported to you, did you take action with all the means at your disposal?
KESSELRING: I at least tried to do so, if only for the sake of maintaining the reputation of the German Wehrmacht and also in the interests of the relations of the Wehrmacht with our Italian allies. I therefore thought it expedient to deal severely with any German soldier who committed an offense. As I was mindful of the fact that war is a brutal business and the longer it lasts the more brutal it becomes, particularly if the leaders and subordinates are no longer able to cope with their tasks, I had recourse to preventive measures. The preventive regulations, which I am sure were seen at many places by the Allied Forces during their advance through Italy, my various announcements of the penalties imposed which became generally known, are the best proof of what I just said.
As a preventive measure I ordered whole towns, or if this was not possible, their centers to be cleared of military and administrative offices and soldiers, and barricaded off. Furthermore, as far as air raid precautions allowed, the soldiers were garrisoned and billeted in confined areas. I also ordered detached individual soldiers, who are usually the cause of such trouble—for instance soldiers going on and returning from leave—to be grouped together, and nonmilitary vehicles to form convoys. For control purposes I had cordons drawn by military police, field police, gendarmes, with mobile courts and flying squads attached to them.
The buying-up of Italian goods, which was partly the cause of the trouble, was to be restricted by establishing stores, in co-operation with the Italian Government, along the return routes, and here the soldiers could buy something to take home. This was enforced by penalties. German offenders reported to me by the Italians, I had prosecuted or I myself took proceedings against them. Whenever local operations prevented my personal intervention, as for instance at Siena, I notified the Wehrmacht that I would have the case dealt with by court martial at a later date. In other cases, when the situation was critical, I declared an emergency law and imposed the death penalty for looting, robbery, murder, et cetera. The death penalty was, however, rarely found to have a deterrent effect. I took action against officers who, naturally disposed to shield their men, had shown too great leniency.