KESSELRING: One could put it like that. I would express it differently. As I said, the air force is essentially an offensive weapon, no matter whether it is used for defense or for attack.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think you have improved on my sentence. Now, in the Netherlands, in Poland . . .
KESSELRING: May I just say something else on the subject?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, yes.
KESSELRING: Namely, what I said yesterday at the very end, that the essential of an offensive air force is the long-distance four-engine heavy bombers, and Germany had none of these.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: How did it come that Germany had none of those?
KESSELRING: Firstly, because being actually in a period of danger, we were confining ourselves to the absolute essentials of a defensive air force only.
Secondly, we tried, in keeping with our characteristics, to achieve as much as possible by precision bombing, in other words, by dive-bombing, utilizing the minimum of war material, and I am here thinking of the Ju 88 as a typical example of that.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were examined by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, were you not, on the 28th of June 1945? Do you recall that?
KESSELRING: Yes, of course.