DR. STAHMER: On 19 October 1939 you published a decree which ordered the removal of economic goods from Poland. This decree has been submitted in Document Number EC-410. I should like to have your opinion on this decree.
GÖRING: This is a decree which represents general instructions as to what economic procedure should be adopted in the whole of the Polish territory occupied by us. It regulates the seizure and administration of property of the Polish State within the territories occupied by German troops, money and credit matters, the taking of economic measures, the preparation for a settlement with foreign creditors which would become necessary, et cetera. Confiscation was to be carried out only by the Main Trustee Office East, et cetera. It is not so much a question of the removal of economic goods. That was not the case. On the contrary, even in the Government General, the economy in existence there, that economy of course which could be used for purposes of war at that time, was strengthened and extended. Such economy as was not absolutely essential was cut down, just as in the rest of Germany and in all other states in the event of war. As far as those raw materials are concerned which were available and were important for the conduct of the war, such as steel or copper or tin, it was my view, or better said my intention, that these raw materials should be converted into manufactured products there where they could most quickly be used for manufacture. If the locality and its transportation facilities permitted it, they should remain and be used for manufacture there. If it was not possible to use them for manufacture on the spot, I would of course not let raw materials of importance for the war lie there, but would have them brought to wherever they could most quickly be used to serve the needs of the war. That is in general, what this decree says. That was my basic attitude and my basic instruction. The object was the quickest and most purposeful use for manufacture wherever it was possible.
DR. STAHMER: On 19 November 1945 a Dr. Kajetan Mühlmann made an affidavit, which has been presented by the Prosecution under Document Number 3042-PS. In this it says the following in three short sentences:
“I was the Special Deputy of the Governor General of Poland, Hans Frank, for the safeguarding of art treasures in the Government General from October 1939 to September 1943. This task was given to me by Göring in his capacity as the Chairman of the Committee for Reich Defense. I confirm that it was the official policy of the Governor General, Hans Frank, to take in custody all important works of art which belonged to Polish public institutions, private collections and the church. I confirm that the mentioned works of art were actually confiscated and I am aware that, in the event of a German victory, they would not have remained in Poland but would have been used to complete German art collections.”
GÖRING: Actually I had nothing directly to do with the safeguarding of art treasures in Poland, absolutely nothing, in my capacity as Chairman of the Ministerial Council for the Reich Defense. However, Mühlmann, whom I knew, did come to see me and told me that he was to take steps for the safeguarding of art treasures there. It was my view too that these art treasures should be safeguarded during the war, regardless of what was to be done with them later, so that no destruction would be possible through fire, bombing, et cetera. I want to emphasize now—I shall refer to this matter again later in connection with France—that nothing was taken from these art treasures for my so-called collection. I mention that just incidentally. That these art treasures were actually safeguarded is correct, and was also intended, partly for the reason that the owners were not there. Wherever the owners were present, however—I remember Count Potocki of Lincut, for instance—the art collections were left where they were. The Führer had not yet finally decided what was to be done with these art treasures. He had given an order—and I communicated that by letter to Mühlmann and also, as far as I remember, to Frank—that these art treasures were for the time being to be brought to Königsberg. Four pictures were to be taken to the safety “bunker” or the safety room of the German Museum in Berlin or to the Kaiser Friedrich Museum in Berlin. The Dürer drawings in Lemberg also figured here. In this connection I want to mention them now, since the Prosecution has already concerned itself with them. The Dürer drawings in Lemberg were not confiscated by us at that time, because Lemberg had become Russian. Not until the march against Russia were these Lemberg drawings—as far as I can remember from Mühlmann’s story—rescued from the burning city in the battle by a Polish professor, who had hidden from the Russians until that time, and he gave them over to him. They were drawings and he came with them to visit me. Although I am usually very interested in such things I unfortunately did not have time to look at them properly, as I was on my way to the Führer at the moment. I took them along with me and, as Mühlmann has confirmed, delivered them there immediately. Where they went after that I do not know. I believe I have now answered the question about the Polish art treasures. Apart from that there is still the Veit Stoss altar, which was originally made here in Nuremberg, a purely German work. The Führer wished that this altar should come to the Germanisches Museum here in Nuremberg—with that I personally had nothing to do. I merely know about it. What was intended to be done with it finally had not yet been stated. But it is certain that it also would have been mentioned in negotiations for peace.
DR. STAHMER: What connection did you have with Quisling?
GÖRING: I met Quisling for the first time long after the occupation of Norway, for the first and only time. He was in Berlin, visited me, and we had a short, unimportant conversation. Before that, that is before the outbreak of war, one of his men whom I did not know personally sent a letter to me, which has been shown to me here but which I myself cannot remember, as such letters, according to our practice, were hardly ever submitted to me—that is immaterial. In that letter he expressed himself in Quisling’s name to the effect that we should give financial support to Quisling’s movement, and he described to what extent political money contributions, on the one side from Russia—the Communist Party there—and on the other from England, would flow into the political office concerned. Then I—later on someone discussed with me whether some sort of contribution could be given to Quisling by way of coal deliveries. My point of view was that, because of the foreign exchange situation and other factors—we were not so rich, we naturally could not compete with the Russian or English money contributions—those authorities should be consulted who could judge whether it was expedient to give the Quisling movement financial support or not. If they answered in the affirmative, then it would be perfectly clear to me that Quisling should receive money. The amount concerned, which I also would have given, was very much higher than the amount which was, I believe, paid later on by the Führer by way of the Foreign Office.
I never thought much of such small money contributions; if one was going to give, then one should give properly, so that an end could really be gained thereby. From the last World War I had experience enough in connection with the money which went to the Romanian Parliament, but which was unfortunately too little. On the basis of these experiences it was my advice that if we were to contribute, then we should give the proper amount. Apart from this, as I said, I did not become acquainted with Quisling until much later, and had a very unimportant conversation with him, which I do not remember.
DR. STAHMER: What was your attitude towards the Norway project?
GÖRING: The Norwegian project surprised me rather, since strangely enough for a rather long time I was not informed about it. The Führer went very far in his basic decree, which I already mentioned at the beginning, and did not call in the Air Force until very late. But since the most important part of this undertaking fell to the Air Force, I expressed my views in regard to this in an unmistakable and unfriendly fashion. From a military point of view I was definitely against this undertaking as such, since as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, quite independent of political considerations, I had first of all to think exclusively of strategic considerations. That it would considerably improve my position as far as the Air Force was concerned if my squadrons could operate against England from Norwegian bases was obvious, and would be obvious to any prudent military expert. From the strategic point of view I, as Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, could take only a very definite stand against this undertaking. My objection was, firstly, that I had been informed too late and, secondly, that the plans did not seem quite correct to me.