As far as South America is concerned, I know that we were always accused, by propaganda at least, of economic penetration and attempted domination there. If one considers the financial and commercial possibilities which Germany had before and during the war, and if one compares them with those of Great Britain or America, one can see the untenability of such a statement. With the very little foreign exchange and the tremendous export difficulties which we had, we could never constitute a real danger or be in competition. If that had been the case, the attitude of the South American countries would presumably have been a different one. Not the mark, but only the dollar ruled there.
DR. HORN: Thank you.
DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution have submitted the diary of General Jodl under Document Number 1809-PS. In this diary there are two entries from the first half of 1940, in regard to which I should like to have your opinion. These two entries concern Russia at a time when Germany and Russia were on friendly terms.
I should like to say in advance that the substance of the intentions which are contained in these entries sounds rather fantastic, and that is why I would like to have your opinion as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.
I quote the first entry dated 13 February 1940:
“Have learned from Admiral Canaris that the Rewel Squadron is to be employed in full force going from Bulgaria toward the Caucasus. The Air Force must explain with whom this false idea originated.”
The second entry of May 1940 reads as follows, and I quote verbatim:
“Führer rejects request of the Air Force to set up a listening post in the Caucasus.”
I would like you to tell me what the thoughts were which guided you in these plans as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, and what facts were the basis of those thoughts.
GÖRING: If these entries were made on the basis of a report by Admiral Canaris, who was the chief of foreign intelligence, and if they were entered by Jodl in connection with the special long reconnaissance Rewel Squadron, it is because of the former’s connection with this squadron—to which he himself frequently assigned intelligence or espionage tasks—that he had heard of my intention to use it—which was something which I wanted to have kept especially secret. He apparently informed the High Command of the Armed Forces, where this action, or the intended action, met with complete misapprehension and could not be understood.