SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just let us proceed, quite shortly, with what happened after that.
On the week end of 26 and 27 August you went to England. You have told me that you did not know about the calling off of the attack on the morning of the 26th, and you did not know that the intention of Hitler was to eliminate English intervention. You did not know these points; so you went back to England on the 27th with these fuller terms, and the English answer was that, while they maintained their obligations, they hoped and recommended that the German and Polish Governments might begin negotiations between themselves with regard to the point?
DAHLERUS: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And that was the answer that you brought back.
Now, I just want you to think for a moment of the interview that you had at breakfast time with Göring, I think in his train or in his headquarters, on the 28th of August. You find it at Page 65 of the book, if you want to refresh your memory. At that time, did Göring not try and convince you that the return of Danzig and the Corridor would make no difference to Poland’s military situation?
DAHLERUS: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Because, illustrating it from his own war maps, he thought that Germany was in a position to defeat the Poles anyhow, whether they had the Corridor or whether they hadn’t?
DAHLERUS: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And his Air Forces and the troops were all in position to carry that out?
DAHLERUS: Yes.