DAHLERUS: That is right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not going to go into that in detail; but then he said to you that the Führer was preparing what I think in English is a “magnanimous offer.”
DAHLERUS: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And to show you the nature of the “magnanimous offer,” he hedged in a portion of the bits of Poland. That is also in the preface to your book.
DAHLERUS: Yes.
Sir DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, there are two points about what he hedged in. In fact, it was much more than had been taken from Germany under the Treaty of Versailles.
Secondly, it was entirely different from what was cabled over by the Defendant Von Ribbentrop to Sir Nevile Henderson the next night.
DAHLERUS: That is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And, Mr. Dahlerus, I do not think I can put it better than in your own words, if you will turn to Page 75. Is this how you record it in your book, the second break:
“This map, a reproduction of which is given in this book, is extraordinarily interesting because it illustrates the rapidity and recklessness with which the decisions in this question were reached. I had the map with me when I left for London a few hours later, but it turned out that the boundaries drawn up on it differed very considerably from those given the well-known ‘Project Ribbentrop,’ presented at top speed to Henderson on the night between the 30th and 31st of August.”