THE PRESIDENT: You are putting in these originals, are you?

DR. STAHMER: Yes, indeed.

In that statement from Dr. Uiberreither, dated 27 February 1946, at Page 38 in Document Book Number 2, Your Honor, it says:

“On 25 May 1938”—says Dr. Uiberreither—“that is, after the plebiscite concerning the reunion of Austria with Germany, which had taken place on 10 April 1938, I was appointed Gauleiter of Gau Steiermark.

“A few weeks later—it may have been towards the end of June or the beginning of July 1938—the former Field Marshal Hermann Göring summoned all Gauleiter of the German Reich to Karinhall.

“He there delivered quite a long address to the Gauleiter, describing the political situation as it was at the time, and discussing in detail the purpose and significance of the Four Year Plan.

“Field Marshal Göring first pointed out that other countries had little understanding for the political developments in Germany, and that consequently there existed the danger of Germany’s being encircled. Directing German foreign policy was therefore a difficult task. Consequently, we should endeavor to strengthen Germany from the economic and military point of view, in order to reduce the danger of Germany being attacked by a foreign power. At the same time, this would result in Germany once more exercising an increasingly important influence in European politics after she had again become strong.

“After that, Field Marshal Göring discussed the Four Year Plan. In this connection he remarked:

“By and large, Germany was cut off from the world’s sources of raw materials and she therefore had to open up sources in her own territory by dint of increased efficiency. This would be done merely in order to make Germany independent of foreign countries, and was not by any means to serve the purpose of preparing for an aggressive war.

“He then stressed, with great emphasis, that Germany’s foreign policy would have to be conducted in such a way that war should not ensue under any circumstances. The present generation was still feeling the effects of a lost World War; the outbreak of another war would be a shock to the German people. Furthermore, it was his opinion that a new war might assume great proportions, and even the outcome of a war against France alone would be questionable.