DR. SEIDL: I do not say that the Fourteen Points of Wilson, per se, are admissible evidence. I do assert, on the other hand, that the connection between these Fourteen Points of Wilson and the Treaty of Versailles, and the contradiction resulting therefrom are of causal significance for the Conspiracy alleged by the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: Then you are really saying that the Versailles Treaty, insofar as it departed from the Fourteen Points, was an unjust treaty?
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, whether the treaty was just or not is a point which I do not wish to prove with this document at all. Whether the treaty was unjust or not is in my opinion a fact which perhaps is beyond the scope of these proceedings. I do assert, however, that the treaty, at least in many of its terms, did not bring that which the victorious states themselves expected of it.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you wish to add anything more, Dr. Seidl?
DR. SEIDL: Not at this point.
DR. RUDOLF DIX (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): Since it is a very fundamental question which has been raised now for discussion by Sir David, and since the Defense must always calculate on the possibility that the Tribunal, even at this point, may make a decision on the question of whether and how far such documentary material as that discussed can be produced, I consider myself duty-bound to add to the statements of my colleague, Dr. Seidl, with whom I agree fully, just a few supplementary words. And I would like to reply to the very precise question of Your Lordship which starts, “Do you consider it relevant...?” I believe—and I will avoid any repetition—that a very vital point as far as relevancy is concerned has not been brought out yet, and that is the subjective aspect; that is the relevancy of the investigation of evidence and of facts regarding the subjective state of the individual defendant, that is, of the facts as seen from within.
If, for example, one of the defendants committed an act which was, considered purely objectively, a breach of the Treaty of Versailles, then, as far as criminal law is concerned and looking at it from the subjective view, it is of great significance whether in the opinion of reasonable, just, and educated men of all nations, he acted with an attitude and with a viewpoint which was not merely his special viewpoint, but that of the most serious men of the various nations and also of those nations which fought against Germany in the years 1914-18. In order not to be too abstract, I should like to cite a concrete example:
A defendant holds the opinion that he is entitled to rearmament—not to aggressive war; I will not touch this question. He considers rearmament justified, either because the treaty has not been kept by the other side or because owing to expressis verbis, or to some action, it is to be considered obsolete. In my opinion it is of decisive relevancy whether this defendant with this point of view, which explains his action, is alone in all the world, or whether the opinion which guides his action is held by men who are to be taken seriously, and who belonged to other nations, even to those who in the years 1914-18 stood on the other side and were his enemies.
Rearmament according to the Prosecution, as I understand, is not a crime, as such, but is merely used by the Prosecution as a charge for the proving of the crime of having carried on an aggressive war. If, now, a defendant can prove that he acted from clean and decent views, views which, as stated, were held by such men of other nations as I have described, and acted conscientiously and with a clear conscience both as regards international law and international morals and also as regards the needs of his country, then this material, which contains opinions, literary statements, speeches, that coincide with the views of the defendant in question, is not only of relevant, but of entirely decisive significance. This viewpoint I ask the Tribunal to bear in mind, if it desires to decide now the question of principle which Sir David has just now raised for debate, and which he had to raise, as I fully recognize. Moreover I am also now in the agreeable position of being able to agree with Sir David in the practical handling of this matter. I too—and I am speaking now for myself only—would prefer to have the decision on this question postponed until the time suggested by Sir David. As far as I am concerned I will accept the disadvantages, which Dr. Seidl is right in seeing, because an advantage will result if the Tribunal decides this question at that time, since it will then have a much larger view on all questions and shades which are important for the decision. And at this point I am not at all in a position to speak comprehensively about them, for I do not want to make any summarizing speech, but just to treat one aspect of this question of evidence.
DR. MARTIN HORN (Counsel for Defendant Von Ribbentrop): I should like to add a few remarks to those made by my colleague Dr. Dix. I request the Tribunal...