DR. HORN: Thereupon, Ribbentrop declared to Sir Nevile Henderson that he could not receive the ambassador, is that right?
SCHMIDT: No. I was speaking about a conference which the Foreign Minister had with the Polish Ambassador in the course of which the latter was asked whether he had authority to negotiate. To this he replied “no,” whereupon the Foreign Minister said that in this case naturally no conversation could take place.
DR. HORN: Then Von Ribbentrop did not hand the memorandum which we mentioned previously to Sir Nevile Henderson. Did you have the impression that Ribbentrop did not submit the text of the ultimatum to Ambassador Sir Nevile Henderson because he did not wish to or because he was not allowed to do so?
SCHMIDT: It is difficult for me to give a clear-cut answer to this question as I was not present at the preliminary discussions which Hitler doubtless had with the Foreign Minister regarding that point before the conference with the British Ambassador. I, therefore, have to rely on the impressions I got during the conference with the British Ambassador; and from these I can draw my conclusions as to the instructions Hitler may have given the Foreign Minister for this conference. In this connection I can say the following:
When Henderson requested that the document containing the German proposals be submitted to him, the Foreign Minister said: “No, I cannot give you the document.” These are the words he used. This of course was a somewhat unusual procedure because normally Sir Nevile Henderson had the right to expect that a document which had just been read out would be handed to him. I myself was rather surprised at the Foreign Minister’s answer and looked up because I thought I had misunderstood. I looked at the Foreign Minister and heard him say for the second time: “I cannot give you the document.” But I saw that this matter caused him some discomfort and that he must have been aware of the rather difficult position in which he found himself by this answer, because an uneasy smile played on his lips when he said in a quiet voice to Sir Nevile Henderson these words, “I cannot give you the document.” Then I looked at Sir Nevile Henderson as I of course expected him to ask me to translate the document, but this request was not forthcoming. I looked at Henderson rather invitingly, since I wanted to translate the document, knowing how extraordinarily important a quick and complete transmission of its contents to the British Government was. If I had been asked to translate I would have done so quite slowly, almost at dictation speed, in order to enable the British Ambassador in this roundabout way to take down not merely the general outline of the German proposal, but all its details and transmit them to his Government. But Sir Nevile Henderson did not react even to my glance so that the discussion soon came to an end and events took their course.
DR. HORN: Did you, on the morning of 3 September 1939, receive the British ultimatum to the German Government?
SCHMIDT: Yes, that is correct.
DR. HORN: To whom did you submit this ultimatum?
SCHMIDT: On the morning of the 3rd, at about 2 or 3 o’clock, the British Embassy telephoned the Reich Chancellery, where I was still present with the Foreign Minister in order to be available for possible conferences, to give the information that the British Ambassador had received instructions from his government, according to which, at exactly 9 o’clock, he was to make an important announcement on behalf of the British Government to the Foreign Minister. He therefore asked to be received by Herr Von Ribbentrop at that time. He was given the reply that Ribbentrop himself would not be available but that a member of the Foreign Office, namely I, would be authorized to receive the British Government’s announcement from the British Ambassador on his behalf. Thus it happened that at 9 o’clock in the morning I received the British Ambassador in Ribbentrop’s office. When I asked him to be seated Henderson refused and while still standing he read to me the well-known ultimatum of the British Government to the German Government, according to which, unless certain conditions were fulfilled by Germany, the British Government would consider themselves at war with Germany at 11 o’clock that morning.
After we had exchanged a few words of farewell, I took the document to the Reich Chancellery.