In 1919 I resigned from the Armed Forces as a first lieutenant, and I turned to the profession of a businessman. Through these business contacts, I came to know particularly England and France rather intimately during the following years. Several contacts with politicians were already established at that time. I tried to help my own country by voicing my views against Versailles. At first it was very difficult but already in the years 1919, 1920, and 1921, I found a certain amount of understanding in those countries, in my own modest way.
Then, it was approximately since the years 1929 or 1930, I saw that Germany after the seeming prosperity during the years 1926, 1927, and 1928, was exposed to a sudden economic upheaval and that matters went downhill very fast.
During the year 1931 and 1932, one noticed as a businessman, which I was at the time, that in practice the consequences of Versailles were such that German economic life was becoming more and more prostrate. Then I looked around. At that time, I was closely attached to the German People’s Party and I saw how the parties became always more and more numerous in Germany. I remember that in the end we had something like 30 parties or more in Germany, that unemployment was growing steadily, and that the government was losing the confidence of the people more and more. From these years I clearly recollect the efforts made by the then Chancellor Brüning, which were doubtlessly meant sincerely and honestly but which nevertheless had no success.
Other governments came, that is well known. They, too, had no success. The export trade in Germany no longer paid for itself. The gold reserves of the Reichsbank dwindled, there was tax evasion, and no confidence at all in the measures introduced by the government. That, roughly, was the picture which I saw in Germany in the years 1930 and 1931. I saw then how strikes increased, how discontented the people were, and how more and more demonstrations took place on the streets and conditions became more and more chaotic.
I do not think that I am exaggerating if I say that the picture which presented itself in the years 1930, 1931, and 1932, particularly 1932, in Germany was not unlike the symptoms of civil war. For me as a German—and I think I have always been a patriot like many other Germans—it made a frightful impression. Actually I was not very close to the political world, but during those years I realized that something had to be done and that everyone, wherever he might be, would have to help or assist to create a national front on a broad basis which would once more have the confidence of men and particularly of the large working masses of the people. At the same time, I was aware that most of the men who were responsible for Versailles had not intended this—I am sure of it—but it was a fact which I believe no one can deny today. I have already mentioned the disappointment I experienced as a young officer through personal contacts, in particular, with the German Ambassador at that time, Dieckhoff, who is a distant relative of mine or relative by marriage, the disappointment which in fact we all experienced in the German Armed Forces, among the German people, and in government circles naturally even more—that these Points of Wilson had been so quickly abandoned. I do not propose to make a propaganda speech here. I merely want to represent the facts soberly as I experienced them at the time. There is no doubt that the defenselessness of the German people at that time led to the fact that unfortunately a tendency was maintained among our enemies not toward conciliation but toward hatred or revenge. I am convinced that this was certainly not the intention of Wilson, at that time President of the United States, and I myself believe that in later years, he suffered because of it. At any rate that was my first contact with German politics.
This Versailles now became...
But it is known that even the severe stipulations of Versailles as we experienced them, from the closest personal observation, were not adhered to as is well known. That, too, is perhaps a consequence, an after-effect of a war, in which men drifted in a certain direction and just could not or would not adhere to certain things. It is known that the stipulations of Versailles were not observed then either territorially speaking or in other very important points. May I mention that one of the most important questions—territorial questions—at that time was Upper Silesia and particularly Memel, that small territory. The events which took place made a deep impression on me personally. Upper Silesia particularly, because I had many personal ties there and because none of us could understand that even those severe stipulations of Versailles were not observed. It is a question of minorities which also played a very important part. Later I shall have to refer to this point more in detail, particularly in connection with the Polish crisis. But right from the beginning, German minorities, as is known, suffered very hard times. At that time it was again Upper Silesia particularly, and those territories which were involved and suffering under that problem, under that treatment. Further, the question of disarmament was naturally one of the most important points of Versailles. And that, too, has already been referred to in this courtroom. Therefore I do not want to go into detail.
At any rate, it was the denial of equality in all these spheres, the denial of equal rights, which made me decide that year to take a greater part in politics. I would like to say here quite openly that at that time I often talked to French and British friends, and of course it was already a well-known fact, even then—after 1930 the NSDAP received over 100 seats in the Reichstag—that here the natural will of the German people broke through to resist this treatment, which after all meant nothing more than that they wanted to live. At the time these friends of mine spoke to me about Adolf Hitler, whom I did not know at the time, they asked me, “What sort of a man is Adolf Hitler? What will come of it? What is it?” I said to them frankly at that time, “Give Germany a chance and you will not have Adolf Hitler. Do not give her a chance, and Adolf Hitler will come into power.”
That was approximately in 1930 or 1931. Germany was not given the chance, so on 30 January 1933 he came—the National Socialists seized power.
DR. HORN: How and when did you come to know Adolf Hitler?