VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct. That was a great surprise to us. I know that I read the memorandum, and for a moment I simply could not believe that such an answer had been given, when one considers that for months we had tried to find a solution, which—and I wish to emphasize this—only Adolf Hitler, at that time, with his great authority over the German people could bring about and be responsible for.
I do not want to get lost in details, but I do want to say that the Danzig and Corridor problem, since 1919, had been considered by statesmen of great authority the problem with which somehow the revision of Versailles would have to start. I should like to remind you of the statement by Marshal Foch and other statements by Winston Churchill, who also elaborated on this subject, as well as by Clemenceau, et cetera. All these statesmen were undoubtedly of the opinion that a territorial revision of this Corridor would really have to be undertaken. But Hitler, for his part, wanted to make it an overall settlement and reach an understanding with Poland on the basis of his putting up with the Corridor and taking only Danzig back into the Reich, whereby Poland was to be afforded a very generous solution in the economic field. That, in other words, was the basis of the proposals which I had been working on for 4 to 5 months on Hitler’s order. All the greater was our surprise when, suddenly, the other side declared that a further pursuit of these plans and solutions, which we regarded as very generous, would mean war. I informed Hitler of this, and I remember very well that Hitler received it very calmly.
DR. HORN: Is it correct that on the following day you stated to the Polish Ambassador that the memorandum of 26 March 1939 could not serve as the basis for a solution?
VON RIBBENTROP: That is true. I just said that Hitler received this harsh and serious message of the Polish Ambassador very calmly. He said, however, that I should tell the Polish Ambassador that of course no solution could be found on this basis. There should be no talk of war.
DR. HORN: Is it true that thereupon, on 6 April 1939, the Polish Foreign Minister Beck traveled to London and returned with a temporary agreement of mutual assistance between Poland, England, and France?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct.
DR. HORN: What was the German reaction to this pact of mutual assistance?
VON RIBBENTROP: The German reaction—here I might refer to Hitler’s Reichstag speech in which he stated his attitude toward this whole problem. We felt this pact of mutual assistance between Poland and England to be not in agreement with the German-Polish pact of 1934, for in the 1934 pact any application of force was excluded between Germany and Poland. By the new pact concluded between Poland and England without previous consultation with Germany, Poland had bound herself for example, to attack Germany in case of any conflict, between Germany and England. I know that Adolf Hitler felt that it was also not in conformity with the agreements between him and Mr. Chamberlain in Munich, namely, the elimination of any resort to force between Germany and England, regardless of what might happen.
DR. HORN: Is it true that Germany then sent through you a memorandum to Poland on 28 April by which the German-Polish declaration of 1934 was rescinded?
VON RIBBENTROP: That is true. It was, I believe, on the same day as the Reichstag speech of the Führer. This memorandum stated more or less what I have just summarized here, that the pact was not in agreement with the treaty of 1934 and that Germany regarded this treaty as no longer valid.