VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not to be understood in that way. I must state the following in this connection. The situation was this at that time: Hitler wanted under all circumstances to keep Italy on our side. Italy was always a very unreliable partner. For that reason the Führer spoke at that time in a way designed to tell Italy, so to speak, that, if it came to difficulties with Yugoslavia, he would support Italy. It can be understood only from the situation which was this: Germany, with Italy’s assistance, had already peacefully carried out some of her revisions in Europe, except for Danzig and the Corridor, in which Mussolini supported Hitler. I remember the situation.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is quite a long explanation. But it is not an explanation of the words I put to you which is the important thing. “It would be best to liquidate uncertain neutrals one after the other.” Are you denying that that was your policy, to liquidate uncertain neutrals?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, it was not that. That cannot be taken so literally, for in diplomatic discussions—and I do not think it is different in other countries—many things are said sometimes...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to...
VON RIBBENTROP: This was the question of Yugoslavia.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This had always been Mussolini’s view, hadn’t it, that the Balkans should be attacked at the earliest possible opportunity?
VON RIBBENTROP: That I do not know.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, would you look at Document 2818-PS. My Lord, this will be Exhibit GB-292. Remember this is the secret additional protocol to the Friendship and Alliance Pact between Germany and Italy made on the 22d of May 1939, and appended to it there are some comments by Mussolini on the 30th of May 1939. Do you see?
VON RIBBENTROP: What page?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I just wanted you to look at two passages. Do you see where the comments by Mussolini begin? Under the Pact itself, do you see the comment by Mussolini?