VON RIBBENTROP: That could be; at that time for an attack on England.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. I am taking it shortly, because you have given your explanation. You say you were at war with England, and therefore you were entitled to see an ally in the Japanese. That is your point, is it not?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not believe that I did anything other than what other diplomats would do, for instance, what those of Great Britain have done in America, and later in Russia.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not going to put any points to you on that actual fact; but it did occur to you quite early, didn’t it, that if Japan came into the war, then it was a possibility that the United States might be brought in very shortly after? And you agreed, in April of 1941, that if the coming in of Japan produced the fact that Japan would be involved with the United States, you would be prepared to fight the United States too. That is right isn’t it?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not correct. I believe I did everything I could, until the day of Pearl Harbor, to keep America out of the war. I believe also that that is proved by many documents that I have seen here for the first time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, since you said that, I would like you to look at the Document 352 of your book, at Page 204 of the English document book.
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I know this document; I have read it here already.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that was a week before Pearl Harbor, on the 29th of November; and according to the Japanese Ambassador, you are saying this to him—if you look at Paragraph 1:
“Ribbentrop: ‘It is essential that Japan effect the New Order in East Asia without losing this opportunity. There never has been, and probably never will be, a time when closer co-operation under the Tripartite Pact is so important. If Japan hesitates at this time and Germany goes ahead and establishes her European New Order, all the military might of Britain and the United States will be concentrated against Japan. As the Führer Hitler said today, there are fundamental differences in the very right to exist between Germany and Japan, and the United States. We have received advice to the effect that there is practically no hope of the Japanese-United States negotiations being concluded successfully, because of the fact that the United States is putting up a stiff front.
“ ‘If this is indeed the fact of the case, and if Japan reaches a decision to fight Britain and the United States, I am confident that that will not only be to the interest of Germany and Japan jointly, but would bring about favorable results for Japan herself.’ ” (Document D-656)