DR. NELTE: What did the military leaders know about Belgium and Holland’s attitude?
KEITEL: This naturally changed several times in the course of the winter. At that time, in the autumn of 1939—I can speak only for myself, and there may be other opinions on this matter—I was convinced that Belgium wanted to remain out of the war under any circumstances and would do anything she could to preserve her neutrality. On the other hand, we received, through the close connections between the Belgian and Italian royal houses, a number of reports that sounded very threatening. I had no way of finding out whether they were true, but we learned of them, and they indicated that strong pressure was exerted on Belgium to give up her neutrality.
As for Holland, we knew at that time only that there were General Staff relations between her and England.
But then of course, in the months from October 1939 to May 1940 the situation changed considerably and the tension varied greatly. From the purely military point of view, we knew one thing: That all the French swift units, that is motorized units, were concentrated on the Belgian-French border, and from a military point of view, we interpreted this measure as meaning that at least preparations were being made for crossing through Belgium at any time with the swift units and advancing up to the borders of the Ruhr district.
I believe I should omit details, here, because they are not important for the further developments, they are of a purely operative and strategic nature.
DR. NELTE: Were there differences of opinion between the generals and Hitler with reference to the attack in the West which had to take place through this neutral territory?
KEITEL: I believe I must say that this at that time was one of the most serious crises in the whole war, namely, the opinions held by a number of generals, including the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Brauchitsch, and his Chief of General Staff, and I also personally belong to that group, which wanted at all costs to attempt to prevent an attack in the West which Hitler intended for that winter. There were various reasons for this: The difficulty of transporting the Eastern Army to the West; then the point of view—and this I must state—the fact that we believed at that time, perhaps more from the political point of view, that if we did not attack, the possibility of a peaceful solution might still exist and might still be realizable. Thus we considered it possible that between then and the spring many political changes could take place. Secondly, as soldiers, we were decidedly against the waging of a winter war, in view of the short days and long nights, which are always a great hindrance to all military operations. To Hitler’s objection that the French swift forces might march through Belgium at any time and then stand before the Ruhr district, we answered that we were superior in such a situation in a war of movement, we were a match for it; that was our view. I may add that this situation led to a very serious crisis between Hitler and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and also me, because I had this trend of thought which Hitler vigorously rejected because it was, as he declared, strategically wrong. In our talks he accused me in the sharpest manner of conspiring against him with the generals of the Army and strengthening them in their opposition to his views. I must state here that I then asked to be relieved immediately of my post and given another, because I felt that under these circumstances the confidence between Hitler and myself had been completely destroyed, and I was greatly offended. I may add that relations with the Commander-in-Chief of the Army also suffered greatly from this. But the idea of my discharge or employment elsewhere was sharply rejected, I would not be entitled to it. It has already been discussed here; I need not go into it any further. But this breach of confidence was not to be mended, not even in the future. In the case of Norway, there had already been a similar conflict because I had left the house. General Jodl’s diary refers to it as a “serious crisis.” I shall not go into this in detail.
DR. NELTE: What was the reason for Hitler’s speech to the Commanders-in-Chief on 23 November 1939, in the Reich Chancellery?
KEITEL: I can say that this was very closely connected with the crisis between Hitler and the generals. He called a meeting of the generals at that time to present and substantiate his views, and we knew it was his intention to bring about a change of attitude on the part of the generals. In the notes on this speech, we see that individual persons were more than once directly and sharply rebuked. The reasons given by those who had spoken against this attack in the West were repeated. Moreover, he now wanted to make an irrevocable statement of his will to carry out this attack in the West that very winter, because this, in his view, was the only strategic solution, as every delay was to the enemy’s advantage. In other words, at that time, he no longer counted on any other solution than resort to force of arms.
DR. NELTE: When, then, was the decision made to advance through Belgium and Holland?