DR. NELTE: You said you wanted to say something else about the case of Yugoslavia. Reich Marshal Göring has made statements upon that subject here. Can you add anything new? Otherwise, I have no further questions with regard to that subject.
KEITEL: I should merely like to confirm once more that the decision to proceed against Yugoslavia with military means meant completely upsetting all military advances and arrangements made up to that time. Marita had to be completely readjusted. Also new forces had to be brought through Hungary from the North. All that was completely improvised.
DR. NELTE: We come now to Fall Barbarossa. The Soviet Prosecution, particularly, have stressed that the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces and you as Chief of Staff, as early as the summer of 1940, had dealt with the plan of an attack against the Soviet Union. When did Hitler for the first time talk to you about the possibility of a conflict, of an armed conflict with the Soviet Union?
KEITEL: As far as I recollect, that was at the beginning of August 1940, on the occasion of a discussion of the situation at Berchtesgaden, or rather at his house, the Berghof. That was the first time that the possibility of an armed conflict with the Soviet Union was discussed.
DR. NELTE: What were the reasons which Hitler gave at that time which might possibly lead to a war?
KEITEL: I think I can refer to what Reich Marshal Göring has said on this subject.
According to our notions, there were considerable troop concentrations in Bessarabia and Bukovina. The Foreign Minister, too, had mentioned figures which I cannot recall, and there was the anxiety which had been repeatedly voiced by Hitler at that time that developments might result in the Romanian theater which would endanger our source of petroleum, the fuel supply for the conduct of the war, which for the most part came from Romania. Apart from that, I think he talked about strong or manifest troop concentrations in the Baltic provinces.
DR. NELTE: Were any directives given by you at that time or by those branches of the Wehrmacht which were affected?
KEITEL: No. As far as I can recollect this was confined firstly to increased activities of the intelligence or espionage service against Russia and, secondly, to certain investigations regarding the possibility of transferring troops from the West, from France, as quickly as possible to the Southeast areas or to East Prussia. Certain return transports of troops from the Eastern military districts had already taken place at the end of July. Apart from that no instructions were given at that time.
DR. NELTE: How was the line of demarcation occupied?