KEITEL: We had no reason to think that General Weygand might be, shall we say, inconvenient. In view of the connection with Marshal Pétain, which was started about the end of September and the beginning of October of that year, and the well-known collaboration policy which reached its height in the winter of 1940-41, it was absurd even to think of doing away with the Marshal’s Chief of Staff. An action of this kind would not have fitted into the general policy followed in dealing with the situation in North Africa. We released a large number of officers in the regular French Colonial Army from French prisoner-of-war camps in the winter of 1940-1941 for service with the colonial forces. There were generals among them; I remember General Juin in particular who, as we knew at the time, had been Chief of the General Staff in North Africa for many years. At my suggestion he was put at the disposal of the Marshal by Hitler, obviously with the aim of utilizing him in the colonial service. There had not been the slightest motive for wishing General Weygand ill or to think of anything of the sort.
DR. NELTE: Is it correct that conferences even took place with the French General Staff and Laval about co-operating in operations in Africa and the strengthening of West Africa?
KEITEL: Yes. Among the documents of the French Armistice Delegation there ought to be a large number of documents asking for all sorts of concessions in connection with North Africa and more especially Central and West Africa, owing to the fact that during the winter of 1940-41 riots had taken place in French Central Africa against which the French Government wanted to take measures. I believe that in the spring of 1941 a conference lasting several days took place in Paris with the French General Staff, in order to prepare measures in which the German Wehrmacht, which already had troops stationed in Tripoli in the Italian area, would participate.
DR. NELTE: So there is no apparent motive?
KEITEL: No.
DR. NELTE: Something must have been said, however, in this conversation with Canaris, which led to this misunderstanding. Can you suggest anything which might have caused this misunderstanding?
KEITEL: It can only be that, according to the very comprehensive details given by Lahousen in his testimony, I said at a later meeting, “What about Weygand?” That was the phrase Lahousen used; and he might have drawn the conclusion that, perhaps, in that sense of the word, as he represented it, he kept on saying “in that sense of the word,” and when asked what that meant, he said, “To kill him.” It is due only to that, it can be due only to that. I must say that Canaris was frequently alone with me. Often he brought the chiefs of his departments along. When we discussed matters by ourselves, I thought he was always perfectly frank with me. If he had misunderstood me, there would certainly have been discussions about it, but he never said anything like that.
DR. NELTE: Is it clear to you that if there had been any idea of putting Weygand out of the way, it would have constituted an act of high political significance?
KEITEL: Yes, of course. In the collaboration of the Führer Adolf Hitler and Marshal Pétain an act of that kind would have had the greatest imaginable political significance.
DR. NELTE: Then you still believe that if it had happened, it would have meant the breaking-off of the policy initiated by Hitler?