I will not take the time to read all of it. I am sure you are reading it. Then we move on and we come to this very significant paragraph, with a Number 5:
“However, it must be examined whether there is not in fact an agreement between the policy hitherto pursued and the Bormann letter in the sense that the decrees quoted above and the other instructions of the ministry are to be understood merely as tactical moves, whereas in fact there is no divergence of opinion. The Minister’s reply”—I remind you each time the Minister refers to you—“of 11 August might be considered to point in this direction.”
Then he goes on to say:
“In answer to this it should be pointed out that the Minister knows very well that it is not possible to reorganize a continent of the size of Russia by means of political tactics and by wearing the mask of a liberator, but only by applying a statesmanlike conception appropriate to the political conditions.”—And so on.
And finally he says:
“Another reason why...”
I want to be fair about this document with you. He indicates that perhaps it should not be interpreted merely as a tactical maneuver, because of the inconsistency which this would imply. For in that case the word “liberation” ought never to have been mentioned and no theater should be allowed to stay open, no trade school, no Ukrainian university should be allowed to function.
And finally I would like to read you—not finally—but I would like to read you this significant paragraph. It states—and I think you will allow me to summarize it—that this letter of Bormann’s, which originated from the field headquarters, simply cannot be issued as a ministerial decree, since it would disavow the entire policy hitherto announced by the Minister—yourself.
And in this connection, a few sentences down, says Markull:
“It is necessary to point once more to the obvious similarity between the opinions professed by Koch and the instructions given in the Bormann letter.”