My Lord, I tried to deal with them very shortly because I made a promise to the Tribunal on the time, but I hope that I have indicated very clearly what our objections were.
DR. WALTER SIEMERS (Counsel for Defendant Raeder): Your Honors, it is extremely difficult to define my position with reference to so many documents, especially since I know that these documents have not yet been translated and that the contents, in the main, are therefore not known to those concerned. Therefore, I might point out that there is a certain danger in treating documents in this way. In part they are basic elements of my defense.
Therefore, I should like to state now that in dealing with these documents I shall be compelled, in order to give the reasons for the relevancy of this evidence, to point out those passages which I shall not need to read separately into the record, for as soon as the document book is ready they will be known to the Tribunal and can be read there.
I shall follow the order as outlined by Sir David. First of all, the first group, Document Numbers 9 and 10. The note submitted by Sir David to the Tribunal points out that the submission of these documents conflicts with the ruling given by the Tribunal on 29 March. In reply I should like to point out that this opinion of the Prosecution is an error. The ruling of the Tribunal said that no documents might be submitted concerning the injustice of the Versailles Treaty and the pressure arising from it. These documents do not concern the injustice and the pressure; rather they serve to give a few examples of the subjective attitude of a man like Noske, who was a Social Democrat and certainly did not want to conduct any wars of aggression. A few other statements in Numbers 9 and 10 show the thought of the Government and the ruling class at that time in regard to defensive measures and the fear that in case of an attack on the part of Poland, for instance, the German Armed Forces might be too weak. These are facts pure and simple; and I give you my express assurance that I shall not quote any sentences which might introduce a polemic. Moreover, I need this mainly as a basis for my final pleading.
Number 17 is a very brief excerpt from the book by Henderson, Failure of a Mission, written in 1940. I believe there are no objections to my quoting about 15 lines, if I wish to use them in my final pleading in order to show that Henderson, who knew Germany well, still believed in 1940 that he had to recognize certain positive good points in the regime at that time; and I believe that the conclusion is justified that one cannot expect that a German military commander should be more sceptical than the British Ambassador at that time.
Then we turn to Document Number 45. It is true this document is taken from a book by Churchill; but it deals with a fact which I should like to prove, the fact that already many years before World War I there existed a British Committee for Defense. In the table of contents which Sir David has submitted, the word “Reichsverteidigungsausschuss” is used, and I therefore conclude that this is a mistake on the part of the Prosecution who took it to mean a German Reich Defense Committee; that is not correct. This document shows how it came about that the Prosecution wrongly overestimated the importance of the German Reich Defense Committee, as the Prosecution naturally compared it with the British Committee for Defense, which went very much further in its activities.
Number 47 is evidence to show that when the German Embassy pointed out that an extremely scathing article on Hitler had appeared in the paper News Chronicle, Lord Halifax pointed out in reply that it was not possible for him to exert any influence on the newspaper. I should merely like to compare this with the fact that the Prosecution made it appear as though Raeder had had something to do with the regrettable article in the Völkischer Beobachter: “Churchill sank the Athenia.” Raeder was no more connected with that article than Lord Halifax with the article in the News Chronicle and was unfortunately even more powerless, as far as this article was concerned, than the British Government.
Number 66 deals with the opinion given by Dr. Mosier, a specialist on international law, an opinion on the Norway action in very compressed form, as the Tribunal will surely admit. The Tribunal will also concede that in my defense of the Norway action I must speak at length about the underlying principles of international law. The underlying principles of international law are not an altogether simple matter. I have nothing against presenting this myself in all necessary detail. I was merely guided by the thought that the Tribunal have asked again and again that we save time. I believe that we can save considerable time if this statement of opinion is granted me, so that I shall not have to cite numerous excerpts and authors in detail in order to show the exact legal justification. I could then perhaps deal with the legal questions in half an hour, whereas without this statement of opinion it is utterly impossible for me to treat such a problem in half an hour. If the Prosecution do not object to more time being taken up, then I do not object if the document is denied me. I will merely have to take the consequences.
Number 76 has meanwhile been crossed out, that is, it is granted me by the Prosecution.
Numbers 93 to 96 are excerpts on statements of the official Moscow papers, Isvestia and Pravda. These statements prove that, at least at that time, Soviet opinion regarding the legality of the German action in Norway coincided with the German opinion of that time. If the Tribunal think that these very brief quotations should not be admitted as documents, I would not be too insistent, since at this point in the proceedings I shall in any case be compelled to discuss it. The Tribunal will remember that at that time Germany and Russia were friends, and Soviet opinion on a purely legal problem should, at any rate, be considered as having a certain significance.