DR. DIX: I regret that Mr. Justice Jackson and I understand each other too little. The matter is relevant in the following connection: In this testimony and also in an affidavit which has been read...
THE PRESIDENT: I think we heard three times that the Defendant Schacht went to India. Three times in his evidence he dealt with the fact that he went to India and China. How is it relevant?
DR. DIX: I am not speaking of the journey to India. It had to be mentioned only briefly to explain the connection of time. I put a question, referring to Schacht’s negotiations in Rangoon with the envoy from Chiang Kai-Shek—with the Chinese—and at that point Mr. Justice Jackson raised his objection. But the fact that Schacht maintained friendly connections with Chiang Kai-Shek’s Government and gave support to it, that fact is relevant, and for the same reason for which I attached importance to the fact that it became clear here that in regard to the Union of Soviet Republics also Schacht pursued a pro-Soviet line in his economic policy during the years when Hitler was conducting a political campaign against Russia. Here we have a second instance, where he is demanding relations which were contrary to the principles of Hitler’s policy; that is relations with Chiang Kai-Shek, and so against Hitler’s ally, Japan. It is in this connection that the negotiations with the Chinese are of significance. They will take only a moment’s time at most. They were merely to be mentioned in passing.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that if you consider his relations with China of any importance, it can be stated in one sentence.
DR. DIX: I am of the same opinion.
SCHACHT: I will sum it up in one sentence. In a written memorandum I advised Chiang Kai-Shek’s government to continue holding out against Japan, giving as reason that the economic resources of China would last longer than the economic resources of Japan; and I advised Chiang Kai-Shek to rely primarily on the United States of America in his foreign policy.
DR. DIX: Then upon your return from India, that is, in August 1939, you found a situation which must have appeared quite tense to someone who was just coming back. Did you not then attempt to contact the Cabinet or Hitler in order to discuss this situation?
SCHACHT: Of course, I found a very tense situation in the question of Poland and I used my return as an occasion for writing a letter to Hitler, a letter to Göring, and a letter to Ribbentrop; that is to say, the three leading men, in order to inform them that I had come back from India, leaving it to their discretion and expecting that at least one of them would ask me for an account of my experiences; and then, I should have had an opportunity of talking to the leading men once again. To my very great surprise, I did not get an answer from Hitler at all; I received no reply from Göring; and Herr Von Ribbentrop answered me that he had taken note of my letter. There was therefore no other way for me but to make my own inquiries regarding the real state of affairs on Poland, and when things became critical I took the well-known step, which has already been described here by Herr Gisevius; namely the attempt to gain access to the Führer’s headquarters.
DR. DIX: We need not repeat that. The only question which I still want to ask you is what were you going to tell the generals, particularly General Von Brauchitsch, at that last moment?
SCHACHT: That he still had a chance to avert a war. I knew perfectly well that bare economic and general political statements would of course accomplish nothing with Von Brauchitsch because he would then certainly have referred to Hitler’s leadership. Therefore I wanted to say to him something of quite a different nature and, in my opinion, that is of the most decisive significance. I was going to remind him that he had sworn an oath of allegiance to the Weimar Constitution. I wanted to remind him that the Enabling Act did not delegate power to Hitler but to the Reich Cabinet and I wanted to remind him that in the Weimar Constitution there was and still is a clause, which has never been annulled and according to which, war cannot be declared without previous approval by the Reichstag. I was convinced that Brauchitsch would have referred me to his oath sworn to Hitler and I would have told him: “I also have sworn this oath. You have sworn no oath other than your military one, perhaps, but this oath does not in any way invalidate the oath sworn to the Weimar Constitution; on the contrary, the oath to the Weimar Constitution is the one that is valid. It is your duty, therefore, to see to it that this entire question of war or no war be brought before the Cabinet and discussed there, and when the Reich Cabinet has made a decision, the matter will go before the Reichstag.” If these two steps had been taken, then I am firmly convinced that there would have been no war.