Well, your conversations in Switzerland, then, excepting that with the unknown professor.
SCHACHT: Yes, I tried again and again to shorten the war and to bring about some form of mediation which I always sought for particularly through the good offices of the American President. That is all that I can say here. I do not think I need go into details.
DR. DIX: Very well. Did you in your letters to Ribbentrop and Göring—you have already mentioned Hitler—or besides, did you, during the war, state your views about the policy of the war in writing at any time? First of all, as far as Hitler was concerned.
SCHACHT: I mentioned my discussion with Hitler in February 1940. In the summer of 1941 I wrote a detailed letter to Hitler, and the witness Lammers has admitted its existence. I do not think he was asked about the contents of this letter here, or he was not allowed to talk about it. If I may come back to it; in that letter, I pointed out somewhat as follows—I shall use direct language—“You are at present at the height of your success.”—This was after the first Russian victories.—“The enemy believes that you are stronger than you really are. The alliance with Italy is rather a doubtful one, since Mussolini will one day fall and then Italy will drop out. Whether Japan can still come to your aid at all is questionable in view of Japan’s weakness in the face of America. I assume that the Japanese will not be so foolish as to wage war against America. The output of steel, for instance, in spite of approximately similar population figures, amounts to one-tenth of the American production. I do not think, therefore, that Japan will enter into the war. I now recommend you at all events to reverse foreign policy completely and to attempt with every means to conclude a peace.”
DR. DIX: Did you state your views to Ribbentrop during the war?
SCHACHT: I do not know when it was. On one occasion Herr Von Ribbentrop conveyed to me through his State Secretary, Herr Von Weizsäcker, the reproachful message that I should not indulge in defeatist remarks. That may have been in 1940 or in 1941, during one of those 2 years. I asked where I had made defeatist remarks and it appeared that I had talked to my colleague Funk and had given him extensive reasons why Germany could never win this war. I held this conviction unchangeable at all times before and during the war, even after the fall of France. I answered Ribbentrop through his State Secretary that I, as Minister without Portfolio, considered it my duty to state my opinion to a ministerial colleague in its true conception, and in this written reply I maintained the view that Germany’s economic power was not sufficient to wage this war. This letter, that is, a copy of this letter was sent both to Minister Funk and to Minister Ribbentrop through his State Secretary.
DR. DIX: I think, Your Lordship, this would be a suitable moment...