DÖNITZ: In practice no difference can be established between “(a)” and “(b).” I should like to draw attention in this connection to D. M. S. 3-III, Page 167, under IV; that is the last paragraph of “(b)” of the number mentioned.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: One moment, do you mean “(b)-V”?
DÖNITZ: It says here “(b)-IV”. There...
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That is not printed, Mr. President.
DÖNITZ: “In ships fitted with a defensive armament, open fire to keep the enemy at a distance”—that is (b)-IV—“if you consider that he is clearly intending to effect a capture and that he is approaching so close as to endanger your chances of escape.”
That means therefore that as soon as the ship sights a U-boat, which during war must be assumed to be there for a reason to effect a capture—the ship will, in its own defense, open fire as soon as it comes within range; that is when the submarine has come within range of its guns. The ship, in using its guns for an offensive action, can act in no other way.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, did the armed enemy vessels act then in the manner which you have described; that is, did they really fire as soon as a submarine came within range?
DÖNITZ: Yes. As early as—according to my recollection, the first report came from a U-boat about that on 6 September 1939.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: With this order, however, we find a further supplement under AMS 1-118, dated 13 June 1940, on Page 165, and here we read:
“With reference to D.M.S. Part 1, Article 53, it is now considered clear that in submarine and aerial operations the enemy has adopted a policy of attacking merchant ships without warning. Subparagraph (b) of this article should therefore be regarded as being in force.”