“Only then does the opportunity offer itself for a new attack, or for spotting and noting the opening through which one can shake off the pursuing enemy.”
Then the figure “(c),” that is, “3(c),” and there it says:
“During an attack on a convoy one may have to submerge to a depth of 20 meters to escape from patrols or aircraft and to avoid the danger of being sighted or rammed....”
Thus we are talking here about a convoy. Now we turn to point “(d)” and here it says:
“It may become necessary to submerge to depth when, for example, the destroyer is proceeding directly toward the periscope...”
And then follow instructions on how to act in case of a depth charge attack. Plainly, the whole order deals with...
THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think it is necessary to go into all of these military tactics. He has made a point on Paragraph “e.” He has given his explanation of that paragraph, and I don’t think it is necessary to go into all of these other tactics.
DÖNITZ: I only want to say that the last paragraph about nonrescue must not be considered alone but in this context: First, the U-boats had to fight in the presence of enemy defense near the English ports and estuaries; and secondly, the objectives were ships in convoys, or protected ships, as is shown clearly from the document as a whole.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You said that this order was given about December 1939. Did the German U-boats after the order had been issued actually continue rescues? What experiences did you have?
DÖNITZ: I said that the order was issued for this specific purpose during the winter months. For the U-boats which, according to my memory, went out into the Atlantic again only after the Norwegian campaign, for these U-boats the general order of rescue applied; and this order was qualified only in one way, namely that no rescue was to be attempted if the safety of a U-boat did not permit it. The facts show that the U-boats acted in this light.