DÖNITZ: No, not as a rule; only if subsequently my anxiety was too great. For example, I had a report from a commander that, because he had remained too long with the lifeboats and thus had been pursued by the escorts perhaps—or probably—summoned by wireless, his boat had been severely attacked by depth charges and had been badly damaged by the escorts—something which would not have happened if he had left the scene in time—then naturally I pointed out to him that his action had been wrong from a military point of view. I am also convinced that I lost ships through rescue. Of course I cannot prove that, since the boats are lost. But such is the whole mentality of the commander; and it is entirely natural, for every sailor retains from the days of peace the view that rescue is the noblest and most honorable act he can perform. And I believe there was no officer in the German Navy—it is no doubt true of all the other nations—who, for example, would not consider a medal for rescue, rescue at personal risk, as the highest peacetime decoration. In view of this basic attitude it is always very dangerous not to change to a wartime perspective and to the principle that the security of one’s own ship comes first, and that war is after all a serious thing.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In what years was the practice you have just described followed, that U-boats did not rescue when they endangered themselves?
DÖNITZ: In 1940, that is towards the end of 1939, economic warfare was governed by the Prize Ordinance insofar as U-boats were still operating individually. Then came the operations, close to the enemy coast, of 1939-40 which I have described; the order Number 154 applied to these operations. Then came the Norway campaign, and then when the U-boat war resumed in the spring of 1940, this order of rescue, or nonrescue if the U-boat itself was endangered, applied in the years 1940, 1941, and 1942 until autumn.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was this order put in writing?
DÖNITZ: No, it was not necessary, for the general order about rescue was a matter of course, and besides it was contained in certain orders of the Naval Operations Staff at the beginning of the war. The stipulation of nonrescue, if the safety of the submarine is at stake, is taken for granted in every navy; and I made a special point of that in my reports on the cases which I have just discussed.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In June of 1942 there was an order about the rescue of captains. This has the Number Dönitz-22; I beg your pardon—it is Dönitz Number 23, and is found on Page 45 of Document Book 1, and I hereby submit it. It is an extract from the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff of 5 June 1942. I quote:
“According to instructions received from the Naval Operations Staff submarines are ordered by the Commander of U-boats to take on board as prisoners captains of ships sunk, with their papers, if this is possible without endangering the boat and without impairing fighting capacity.”
How did this order come into being?
DÖNITZ: Here we are concerned with an order of the Naval Operations Staff that captains are to be taken prisoners, that is, to be brought home and that again is something different from rescue. The Naval Operations Staff was of the opinion—and rightly—that since we could not have a very high percentage, say 80 to 90 percent, of the crews of the sunk merchantmen brought back—we even helped in their rescue, which was natural—then at least we must see to it that the enemy was deprived of the most important and significant parts of the crews, that is, the captains; hence the order to take the captains from their lifeboats on to the U-boats as prisoners.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did this order exist in this or another form until the end of the war?