DÖNITZ: Apart from my great and constant anxiety for the submarines and the strong feeling that the British and Americans had not helped in spite of the proximity of Freetown, I learned from this action very definitely that the time had passed when U-boats could carry out such operations on the surface without danger. The two bombing attacks showed clearly that in spite of good weather, in spite of the large numbers of people to be rescued who were more clearly visible to the aviators than in normal heavy sea conditions when few people have to be rescued, the danger to the submarines was so great that, as the one responsible for the boats and the lives of the crews, I had to prohibit rescue activities in the face of the ever-present—I cannot express it differently—the ever-present tremendous Anglo-American air force. I want to mention, just as an example, that all the submarines which took part in that rescue operation were lost by bombing attack at their next action or soon afterwards. The situation in which the enemy kills the rescuers while they are exposing themselves to great personal danger is really and emphatically contrary to ordinary common sense and the elementary laws of warfare.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In the opinion of the Prosecution, Admiral, you used that incident to carry out in practice an idea which you had already cherished for a long time, namely, in the future to kill the shipwrecked. Please, state your view on this.
DÖNITZ: Actually, I cannot say anything in the face of such an accusation. The whole question concerned rescue or nonrescue; the entire development leading up to that order speaks clearly against such an accusation. It was a fact that we rescued with devotion and were bombed while doing so; it was also a fact that the U-boat Command and I were faced with a serious decision and we acted in a humane way, which from a military point of view was wrong. I think, therefore, that no more words need be lost in rebuttal of this charge.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, I must put to you now the wording of that order from which the Prosecution draws its conclusions. I have read it before; in the second paragraph it says, “Rescue is contrary to the most primitive laws of warfare for the destruction of enemy ships and crews.”
What does that sentence mean?
DÖNITZ: That sentence is, of course, in a sense intended to be a justification. Now the Prosecution says I could quite simply have ordered that safety did not permit it, that the predominance of the enemy’s air force did not permit it—and as we have seen in the case of the Laconia, I did order that four times. But that reasoning had been worn out. It was a much-played record, if I may use the expression, and I was now anxious to state to the commanders of the submarines a reason which would exclude all discretion and all independent decisions of the commanders. For again and again I had the experience that, for the reasons mentioned before, a clear sky was judged too favorably by the U-boats and then the submarine was lost; or that a commander, in the role of rescuer, was in time no longer master of his own decisions, as the Laconia case showed; therefore under no circumstances—under no circumstances whatsoever—did I want to repeat the old reason which again would give the U-boat commander the opportunity to say, “Well, at the moment there is no danger of an air attack”; that is, I did not want to give him a chance to act independently, to make his own decision, for instance, to say to himself, “Since the danger of air attack no longer permits.” That is just what I did not want. I did not want an argument to arise in the mind of one of the 200 U-boat commanders. Nor did I want to say, “If somebody with great self-sacrifice rescues the enemy and in that process is killed by him, then that is a contradiction of the most elementary laws of warfare.” I could have said that too. But I did not want to put it in that way, and therefore I worded the sentence as it now stands.
THE PRESIDENT: You haven’t referred us back to the order, but are you referring to Page 36 of the Prosecution’s trial brief, or rather British Document Book?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, Mr. President, Page 36 of the British Document Book.
THE PRESIDENT: There are two orders there, are there not?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: No. It is one order with four numbered parts.