SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, are you saying that you went on with your activities at the beginning of the war without knowing that this was the view of the Naval High Command?
DÖNITZ: I was not informed about this letter. I have said already that my knowledge of it...
THE PRESIDENT: That wasn’t an answer to the question. The question was whether you knew at the time that this was the view of the Naval High Command. Answer the question.
DÖNITZ: No, I did not know that. I knew that the view of the Naval High Command was to follow the measures of the enemy step by step. I knew that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you see, that is the entire difference, Defendant. That is what you said at great length in giving your evidence the day before yesterday and yesterday, that you were answering, step by step, the measures of the enemy. You gave that evidence. Do you say that you didn’t know that this was the view of the Defendant Raeder, formed on the first day of the war? Do you say you didn’t know it at all, you had no inkling that that was Raeder’s view?
DÖNITZ: No; I did not know that because I did not know of this letter; and I do not know if that is Herr Raeder’s view. I do not know.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, again I don’t want to argue with you; but if the Commander, the Chief of the Navy—and I think at that time he called himself chief of the naval war staff as well—allows the chief of his Operational Department to put this view forward to the Foreign Office—is it the practice of the German Navy to allow post captains to put forward a view like that when it is not held by the Commander-in-Chief?
It is ridiculous, isn’t it? No Commander-in-Chief would allow a junior officer to put forward that view to the Foreign Office unless he held it, would he?
DÖNITZ: Will you please ask the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Raeder. I cannot give any information as to how this letter came to be written.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will do that with very great pleasure, Defendant; but at the moment, you see, I have got to question you on the matters that you put forward, and my next question is: Was it not in pursuance of the view and desire expressed in that memorandum that the U-boat command disregarded from the start the London Treaty about warning ships?