THE PRESIDENT: Is that not on Page 41?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am very much obliged to Your Lordship.
[Turning to the defendant.] It is Page 41, at the bottom. It is on 20 September, 1320 hours. That is your wireless message to the U-boat Schacht. Do you see that?
DÖNITZ: Yes, and I explained that in great detail yesterday.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just want to know: Is it true what is stated in your wireless message that the boat was dispatched to rescue Italian allies, not for the rescue and care of Englishmen and Poles? Is that true?
DÖNITZ: That is correct, because the vessel had reported to me that it had four boats in tow—and it says on Page 40, “...with British in tow.” It was clear, considering the whole situation, that a submarine with vessels in tow could not remain on the surface without the greatest danger to itself. Hence on Page 40 under heading 2 the order and the instructions given, “Boats with British and Poles to be cast adrift.” I wanted to get rid of the boats. That was the only reason. And it was only afterwards—Page 41—when a long radio message came from him, which in itself was a repetition but which was interpreted to mean that after the two air attacks had taken place he had again endangered his boat by stopping and picking up men, only then did he receive this wireless message, after it had gradually dawned on me—during the first four days, or perhaps three days, I had nothing against rescuing the British—that the Italians, who after all were our allies, were getting the worst of it, which indeed proved to be the case.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You have given a long explanation. Now, is that wireless message true, that the boat was dispatched to rescue Italian allies, not for the rescue and care of Englishmen and Poles? Is that true or not true?
DÖNITZ: Of course; this wireless message contained both instructions and it becomes unequivocally clear from these two instructions as well as from the impression I had that the British who were rescued far outnumbered the Italians, who were left to drown.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, there is one point I want you to make a little clearer. When you were interrogated about this matter, you said that you were under great pressure at the time; and, I think, that the pressure came to you from Hitler only through Captain Fricke. Is that right?
DÖNITZ: No, “only” is not correct. It was “also.” The pressure, as I have very clearly explained here, was due to worry and anxiety regarding the fate of my submarines, because I knew that they were now being greatly jeopardized. We had evidence of that already from the bombing attacks; secondly, of course, from the Führer’s orders which Fricke gave. But I have also stated here that in spite of that order, even if it was not militarily correct to act in this way, I continued rescuing. However, the pressure, my worry and anxiety, were mostly caused by the fate of the submarines themselves.