FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you write him directly, or how did it happen?
DÖNITZ: No. I received this information through a third person.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was that the only message you received from a concentration camp?
DÖNITZ: The only one I received.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In the cross-examination a report by Captain Assmann was presented about a conference with the Führer in May 1943. You remember its contents. You are alleged to have said that in view of the present naval war situation, it was desirable that Germany should get possession of Spain and Gibraltar. Did you make a positive suggestion in that direction? One cannot see that from the document.
DÖNITZ: Of course, when I discussed the situation, I mentioned the danger of the narrow strip along the Bay of Biscay; and I said that it would be more favorable to us if we could start our U-boats from a wider area. At that time nobody even contemplated a move against Spain, either with the consent of Spain or in the form of an attack. It was quite obvious that our forces were in no way sufficient for that. On the other hand, it is quite understandable that, in showing my concern about that narrow strip, I should say that it would have been better if the area had been larger. That is what I meant by that statement. I was referring to U-boat warfare and not to any move against Spain on land. It certainly would have been impossible for me as a naval officer to make a suggestion to attack Spain.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In connection with the sinking of the Athenia it has been hinted that your statement was considered an excuse; that is, that the commanding officer of the submarine confused the Athenia with an auxiliary cruiser. Therefore, I should like to put to you an excerpt from the war diary of the officer commanding in that action and I want you to confirm that it is really by the same commanding officer. I shall read from the document of the Prosecution, Exhibit GB-222, on Page 142 of my document book, Volume III. It is the war diary of the submarine U-30. The excerpt is dated 11 September 1939, Page 142 in document book, Volume III.
“Sighted a blacked-out vessel. Got on its trail. In zigzag course recognized as merchant ship. Requested to stop by morse lantern. Steamer signals ‘not understood,’ tries to escape in the thick squall and sends out SOS ‘chased by submarine’ and position by radiotelegraphy.
“Gave ‘stop’ signal by radio and morse lantern.
“Ran ahead. First 5 shots with machine gun C/30 across the bow. Steamer does not react. Turns partly, about 90°, directly toward the boat. Sends ‘still chased.’ Therefore, fire opened from aft bearing with 8.8 cm. English steamer Blairlogie, 4,425 tons.