The affidavit also says in the third paragraph:
“The Admiral sharply declined the idea of attacking an enemy rendered defenseless in combat; it was incompatible with our way of waging war.”
In connection with the Prosecution’s Exhibit GB-205 I shall submit a document of my own which deals with the question of terroristic actions. It is an extract from Exhibit GB-194 of the Prosecution, and it can be found on Page 91. It deals with the question of whether the crews of scuttled German ships should be rescued or not. The French press tends to say they should not, in view of the pressing need of the Allies for freight space. The same entry contains a report according to which British warships also had special instructions to prevent further scuttling of German ships.
I now shall try to prove that the principle according to which no commander undertakes rescue actions if he thereby endangers a valuable ship is justified. For that purpose I refer to Document Dönitz-90, which is in the Volume IV of the document book, Page 258. It is an affidavit of Vice Admiral Rogge, retired. He reports that in November 1941 his auxiliary cruiser was sunk from a great distance by a British cruiser and that the survivors had taken to the boats. They were towed away by a German submarine to a German supply ship and this supply ship too, a few days later, was sunk from a great distance by a British cruiser. Once again the survivors took to the boats and to floats. The affidavit closes with the words:
“At both sinkings no attempt was made, presumably due to danger involved for the British cruiser, to save even individual crew members.”
The principle that a valuable ship must not risk rescue actions to save even members of its own crew is expressed with classical clarity and severity in the British Admiralty Orders which I have already submitted as Dönitz-67. The extract is printed on Page 96. There it says:
“Aid to ships attacked by submarines: No British ocean-going merchant ship should aid a ship attacked by U-boats. Small coastal ships, fishing steamers, and other small ships with little draught should give all possible aid.”
The next document I submit is Dönitz-44, which is on Page 97. It is a questionnaire for Vice Admiral Kreisch who, according to a decision by the Tribunal, was interrogated in a British camp for prisoners of war. From January 1942 to January 1944 he was the officer in charge of submarines in Italy, which means that he was responsible for submarine warfare in the Mediterranean. According to his statements he knows of no order or suggestions regarding the killing of survivors. He advised his commanders that rescue measures must not endanger the task and safety of their own ships.
In connection with the question whether Admiral Dönitz was a member of the Reich Government I should like to ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the German Armed Forces Law of 1935 which can be found on Page 105 of Volume II of my document books. Paragraph 3 will show that there was only one Minister for the German Armed Forces and that was the Reich Minister of War. On the following page in Paragraph 37 it is shown that this one Minister was assigned the right to issue legislative orders.
On Page 107 I again have the decree which has been submitted to the Tribunal as Document 1915-PS, in which, dated 4 February, the post of the Reich Minister of War is abolished and the tasks of his Ministry are transferred to the Chief of the OKW. No new Ministry for the Army or the Navy is established.