COL. PHILLIMORE: I did not ask for your general view on the document. We can read that for ourselves. Your object was to terrorize the small neutrals and frighten them from sailing on their ordinary lawful occasions. Is that not right?
WAGNER: No.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And is that not why in the orders you issued in January of 1940 you excepted the larger countries from this “sink at sight” risk? Would you look at Document C-21. That is GB-194, at Page 30 of the Prosecution document book in English; Pages 59 and 60 in the German. Now, just look at the second entry on Page 5, 2 January 1940: “Report by IA.” That is you, is it not? That was you, was it not?
WAGNER: Yes, but I cannot find the point which you are quoting.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Page 5 of the original, under the date of 2 January 1940. Report by IA on directive of Armed Forces High Command, dated 30 December, referring to intensified measures in naval and air warfare in connection with Case Yellow:
“Through this directive the Navy will authorize, simultaneously with the beginning of the general intensification of the war, the sinking by U-boats without any warning of all ships in those waters near the enemy coasts in which mines can be employed. In this case, for external consumption, the use of mines should be simulated. The behavior of, and use of weapons by, U-boats should be adapted to this purpose.”
That has nothing to do with the arming of British merchant ships. That is not the reason that is given, is it? The reason is because it fitted in with your operations for Case Yellow.
WAGNER: I did not understand the last sentence.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You do not give as your reason that the British were arming their merchant ships. The reason you give is that it was necessary in connection with intensified measures for Case Yellow. Why is that?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The German translation is so inadequate that it is almost impossible to understand the question.