WAGNER: We sank them because they entered this area despite warning.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, but if a Russian ship or a Japanese ship did that, you would not sink it.
WAGNER: No, not at that period of time.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I just want to show you what you actually did. Would you look at Documents D-846 and 847?
My Lord, they are two new documents. They will be GB-452 and 453.
[Turning to the witness.] Will you look at the first of these, that is D-846? That is a telegram from your Minister at Copenhagen, dated 26 September 1939. That is before your first warning and before any of these zones had been declared. The second sentence:
“Sinking of Swedish and Finnish ships by our submarines has caused great anxiety here about Danish food transports to England.”
You see, you had started sinking ships of the small neutrals right away in the first three weeks of the war, had you not?
WAGNER: In single cases, yes; but there was always a very special reason in those cases. I know that several incidents occurred with Danish and Swedish ships in which ships had turned against the U-boat and the U-boat in turn because of this resistance was forced to attack the ship.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You do not think it was because the blame could be put upon mines?