DR. DIX: Now, events led to the militarization of the Rhineland, the reintroduction of compulsory military service. Did you have conversations with Schacht in which he said that if this policy of Hitler was pursued it might lead to a war, at least to an armed intervention by other nations which did not approve of such policies? Were there any such conversations between you and Schacht?
VOCKE: Not in the sense of your question. Schacht did speak to me about the incidents when the Rhineland was reoccupied, that is to say, he explained to me how at that time Hitler, as soon as France adopted a somewhat menacing attitude, was resolved to withdraw his occupation forces—Hitler had climbed down—and how he was only prevented in this by Herr Von Neurath, who said to him: “I was against that step, but now that you have done it, it will have to stand.” What Schacht told me at that time about Hitler’s attitude was that Hitler would do anything rather than have a war. Schacht also felt this, as he told me, when he mentioned the friendship with Poland, the renunciation of his claim to Alsace-Lorraine, and, in particular, Hitler’s policy during the first years, all of which was a peaceful policy. Only later did he begin to have misgivings as regards foreign policy.
DR. DIX: What were Schacht’s principles and ideas in foreign policy and how did these line up with his attitude to Hitler’s foreign policy?
VOCKE: He definitely disapproved, especially, of course, since Ribbentrop had gained influence in foreign politics; Schacht saw in him the most incapable and irresponsible of Hitler’s advisers. But already before that there were serious differences of opinion between Schacht and Hitler on foreign policy.
For instance, as regards Russia: Already from 1928-29 onwards Schacht had built up a large trade with Russia by long term credits which helped the economy of both countries. He has often been attacked on account of that, but he said: “I know what I am doing. I also know that the Russians will pay punctually and without bargaining. They have always done it.” Schacht was very angry and unhappy when Hitler’s tirades of abuse spoiled the relations with Russia and brought this extensive trade to an end.
Also, with regard to China, Schacht was convinced of the importance of trade with China and was just about to develop it on a large scale, when Hitler, by showing preference to Japan and recalling the German advisers to Chiang Kai-Shek, again destroyed all Schacht’s plans. Schacht saw that this was a fatal mistake and said that Japan would never be able nor willing to compensate us for the loss of trade with China.
Also Schacht always advocated close co-operation with the United States, with England, and with France. Schacht admired Roosevelt and was proud of the fact that Roosevelt, through the diplomat Cockerill, kept in constant touch with him. Schacht was convinced of the necessity of remaining on the best terms with England and France and for that very reason he disapproved of Ribbentrop being sent to London and actively opposed this plan.
Schacht was against Hitler’s policy towards Italy. He knew that Mussolini did not want to have anything to do with us, and he considered him the most unreliable and the weakest partner.
With regard to Austria, I know only that Schacht thought highly of Dollfuss and was horrified and shocked when he heard of his murder. Also after the occupation of Austria, he disapproved of much that happened there.
May I, in this connection, say a word about Schacht’s colonial policy, which was a sort of hobby of Schacht’s, and about which he once gave a lecture? I can best illustrate Schacht’s views by telling you about the orders which he gave me. Schacht’s idea was to make an arrangement with England, France, et cetera, whereby these powers should purchase part of the Portuguese colony of Angola and transfer it to Germany, who would not exercise any sovereign rights, but would exploit it economically; and he had experts’ opinions...