VOCKE: The result was that first Schacht was dismissed, then Kreide and Huelse, then I, Erhard, and Lessing. The result, however, was that they knew abroad what things had come to in Germany. My colleague Huelse had made unequivocal statements in Basel, and said that if we should be dismissed, then our friends would know to what pass things had come.
DR. DIX: Did Herr Huelse tell you that?
VOCKE: Yes, Huelse told me that.
DR. DIX: Your Lordship, shall we make a short pause here? I have not much more, but I still have the documentary evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: How much longer do you think you will take before you finish?
DR. DIX: It is very short and then the documentary evidence is also very short. Shall I continue?
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[A recess was taken.]
DR. DIX: Now, Witness, you have described to the Tribunal how that dismissal of Schacht and yourself came about. Why did Schacht not take that step before? Did he talk to you about it?
VOCKE: No. Throughout the years 1936 and 1937 we could not make up our minds. At first there was still hope that Hitler would steer a reasonable course as a statesman. Finally, in 1938, we reached a crisis, particularly in connection with the Munich Agreement and then after the Munich Agreement. Then, indeed, there was real anxiety that things would lead to war, and we then saw that we had to force the decision.