RAEDER: I know the people who were there.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let’s look: Lieutenant Colonel Schmundt; he was afterwards General, Hitler’s principal adjutant, and killed on the 20th of July, 1944, isn’t that right? Then the Defendant Göring, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force; yourself as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy; Colonel General Von Brauchitsch who was Commander-in-Chief of the Army; General Keitel who was head of the OKW; General Milch who was Göring’s Deputy; Halder who was Chief of Staff; Schniewind who was your Chief of Staff; and Jeschonnek who was I think a Chief of Staff or a high...
RAEDER: Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. And Colonel Warlimont, who was General Jodl’s assistant.
Now, what do you think Hitler got these high-ranking generals for, and told them, “We are left with a decision to attack Poland at the first opportunity,” if he hadn’t any aggressive intentions? What were these people there for if it wasn’t to develop a war?
RAEDER: I have already explained that the main purpose of that speech, as may be seen from the last part of it, was to give a purely academic lecture on the conduct of war, and on the basis of that lecture to create a special study staff, a project which the chiefs of the Armed Forces had so far strongly opposed. I also explained at the start that his explanations were at first the most confused that I have ever heard regarding the matter, and that he issued no directives in regard to them but that the last lines read: “The branches of the Wehrmacht determine what will be built. There will be no alteration in the shipbuilding program. The armament programs are to be fixed for 1943 or 1944.” When he said that, he could certainly not have intended to solve the Polish question by a war in the near future.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you telling the Tribunal that when he said, “We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair; further successes cannot be obtained without the shedding of blood,” you paid no attention to it at all? You are seriously telling the Tribunal that you paid no attention to that?
RAEDER: No, I certainly did not at all, because by this time I was getting to know Hitler and was familiar with the exaggerations contained in his speeches.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At this time you had already had the directives for a surprise attack on Danzig, in November 1938. You had had the directive on the 3rd of April for the Fall Weiss, and you know this whole matter was en train. Are you seriously, Defendant, telling the Tribunal that you had any doubt after the 23rd of May that Hitler intended war against Poland and was quite prepared to fight England and France, if they carried out their guarantee? I mean, seriously, I give you this chance before we adjourn: Do you say that you had any doubt at all?
RAEDER: Of course; I have surely explained that even in August I was still doubtful. For instance, in estimating this speech, I must compare it, as has already been done here, with the speech which Hitler had made a few weeks earlier at the launching of the Bismarck, where he spoke only of the peace of true justice. Those speeches were decisive for me. I did not base my conclusions on this particular speech which is reproduced in such an extremely confused manner; and that I proved by the fact that during the whole of the summer I never said a word to the Navy to suggest that war might break out in the autumn. Confirmation of that was given here; and anybody can give further confirmation. I thought very highly of Hitler’s political ability and even on 22 August, when we were informed of the pact with Russia, I was still convinced that we should again be able to find a peaceful solution of the problem. That was my definite conviction. I may be accused of faulty judgment, but I thought I had formed a correct estimate of Hitler.