RAEDER: With the beginning of the offensive in the West, Hitler also wanted a certain more energetic pursuit of the war at sea. For that reason, he asked me to introduce only at this point the intensified measures which I considered already justified because of the attitude of the British forces. These intensifications were very carefully considered in that memorandum, and they followed step by step the different steps taken by Britain.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will deal with the memorandum. You need not be afraid that I will omit that, but what I am putting to you at the moment is this: That so far from disapproving of the violation of the neutrality of Holland and Belgium, you on behalf of the Navy were quite prepared to accompany it by the intensification of submarine warfare; isn’t that right?
RAEDER: That is twisting my words. I had nothing to do with this violation of neutrality for we were not there when they marched into these two countries. The only thing I was interested in was to intensify the submarine war step by step, so as to meet the measures introduced by the British, which also violated international law.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am going to come to submarine warfare, but at the moment I want to try to keep in compartments. There are only two more points on this aggressive war. I am now going to pass—you can leave that document for the moment. I will come back to it, Defendant; you need not be afraid, and I want you to help me on one or two points in Norway.
With regard to Norway, you were quite content to leave Norway neutral, not occupied, so long as you had a protected channel up the Norwegian coast in neutral waters, is that right? That was an important point for you, to have a channel in neutral waters so that not only your ships, but also your submarines, could go up and start out from neutral waters, is that right?
RAEDER: No, I have very clearly explained the origin of the Norwegian campaign in documents. There was the danger that the British might occupy Norway, and information of all sorts indicated that. Of course, if we were forced to occupy the Norwegian coast, then, apart from all the numerous disadvantages which I have explained, we had the advantage that we would gain this or that base for our Atlantic submarines.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you telling the Tribunal that the Navy seriously thought that the British wanted to occupy Norway?
RAEDER: I most certainly thought that. We had so much information about it that I could have no doubt whatever, and it was fully confirmed later on.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just ask you, then, to look at just one or two typical Navy reports. We won’t refer to the document again, but we will start from there, just to get the time.
You remember, on the 13th of March 1940, General Jodl entered in his diary that the Führer was still looking for justification; do you remember that? You remember that, don’t you?