“Offensive action against submarines south of the line Memel to the southern tip of Öland is authorized if the boats cannot be definitely identified as Swedish during the approach by German naval forces. The reason to be given up to ‘B’ Day”—that is Barbarossa—“is that our naval forces are believed to be dealing with penetrating British submarines.”
Why did you suggest that you should attack the Soviet submarines 6 days before your own invasion when they wouldn’t be expecting any attack and there was no question of any war?
RAEDER: As it has already been explained once here, it had happened just before, that is before the 15th of June, that a submarine had penetrated into the area of Bornholm, which is a long way to the west, and then had given wrong recognition signals when the patrol boat near Bornholm called it. If the wrong recognition signals are given, then it means that it could not be a German submarine but it must be a foreign one. In this case, the course of the ship and the location would bring us to the conclusion that it must be a Russian boat. Apart from that, Russian submarines at that time had repeatedly been located and reported off German ports—Memel, for instance, and others. Consequently, we had the impression that Russian submarines were already occupying positions outside German ports, either to lay mines or to attack merchant or warships. For that reason, as a precaution, I had to report this and I had to propose that we should take action against non-German submarines in these areas outside German ports. That suggestion was passed on the same day and this additional statement was made, which, in my opinion, was not necessary at all, but which prevented complications from arising.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is still not an answer to my question. I will put it this way. You considered it right to attack and urge the ruthless destruction of Soviet submarines 6 days before you attacked the Soviet Union? You consider that right? And then, to blame it on penetrating British submarines—this is Keitel’s suggestion—is that your view of proper warfare?
RAEDER: Well, I consider the first point right because it is always important to get in before one’s opponent, and this was happening under certain definite conditions. The second point was ordered by the Führer. Neither of the two points was ever carried out, and therefore it is useless, in my opinion, to discuss this matter.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is something for the Tribunal, and I will decide what is useful to discuss.
Do I take it, then, that you entirely approve of attacking Soviet submarines and ruthlessly destroying them 6 days before you start the war? That is what the Tribunal is to understand, is it?
RAEDER: Yes, if they appeared in our waters to reconnoiter or to carry out some other war action, then I considered it right. I considered that better than that our ships should run into Russian mines.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, let us just come, for a short time, to your views on U-boat warfare. Do you remember the document which I put to the Defendant Dönitz about the memorandum of the Foreign Office, Document Number D-851, which became Exhibit Number GB-451?
RAEDER: I have it before me.