“The Navy has arrived at the conclusion that the maximum damage to England which can be achieved with the forces available can only be attained if U-boats are permitted an unrestricted use of arms without warning in the area...”
Is that your view? Was that your view on the 3d of September?
RAEDER: No, it is not my view; it is a conditional view. We had given submarines the order to wage economic war according to the Prize Ordinance, and we had provided in our War Diary that if the British were to arm merchant ships or something like that, then certain intensifications...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you please give me an answer to the question I asked you? It is a perfectly easy question.
RAEDER: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, isn’t it your view?
RAEDER: In theory, of course, considering the small resources that we had, the greatest possible damage to England could only be achieved through—we had to discuss with the Foreign Office just how far we could go with this intensification. For this reason, this officer was sent there. The discussions with the Foreign Office resulted in the submarine memorandum which shows, from beginning to end, that we were trying to adhere to the existing law as far as possible. The whole memorandum is nothing more than just that sort of discussion.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, will you answer my question? When this document says “the Navy has arrived at the conclusion,” is it true that the Navy had arrived at that conclusion?
RAEDER: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Is that true or not?