Then he says that it is necessary to ask for certain information. On that you put in—on that point you put in your memorandum of the 15th of October, which, My Lord, is Document Number C-157, and Exhibit Number GB-224.
RAEDER: First of all, may I say something about the previous document? This expression “unrestricted U-boat warfare...”
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You can do it later on, because we have got a lot of ground to cover here.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, the Tribunal thinks he ought to be allowed to say what he wants to say on that document.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry, My Lord, if Your Lordship pleases. Please go on, Defendant, my fault.
RAEDER: Now the two documents are gone. What I wanted to say was that the expression “unrestricted submarine warfare” on the part of the Foreign Office originated from the previous World War. In reality, and during the entire war, we did not wage unrestricted U-boat war in the sense of the unrestricted submarine warfare of the first World War. Even there, where he says “unrestricted submarine warfare might be imminent”—are only ordered very restricted measures, which always were based on the fact that the British had ordered something on their part. The chief action on the part of the British was that of militarizing the entire merchant fleet to a certain extent. That is to say, the merchant fleet was being armed, and they received the order to use these arms.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don’t see how that arises out of the last document at all. Unless the Tribunal wants to go into it, I think we might pass on.
Doesn’t Your Lordship think so?
RAEDER: Out of both documents. Not out of one only...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You have put that point, I should think, at least seven times this afternoon. I am going to suggest to you that your real object of the submarine war was set out in the first paragraph of the memorandum. Would you just look at it? You see “Berlin, 15 October...”