I would like to add that C-153 and C-135 are connected. I have taken them together for the sake of simplicity. Therefore, I would like to state for the record that 153 is Exhibit USA-43 and may be found in British Document Book 10a, Page 107. It is headed, “Armament Plan (A.P.) for the Third Armament Period.” It is a rather long document and is dated 12 May 1934.
I quote Lohmann’s affidavit on these two documents:
“The above-named documents submitted to me deal with the Establishment Organization Plan, the Combat Organization Plan, the Mobilization Plan, and the Armament Plan. The first three plans, or orders of distribution, deal with the same matters and differ only in manner of composition. The Armament Plan differs from the other plans inasmuch as it deals with new construction and the required new materials and is hence less extensive.
“The German Navy, like the Armed Forces as a whole—and, no doubt, the Armed Forces of every nation—made such plans in order to be able, in the case of a conflict or of military complications, to prepare in time and use efficiently the means of combat available. Owing to changing conditions, military developments, changes in personnel, and advances in technique, such plans were revised every year. An essential part of these preparations, self-evident in the case of any Armed Forces, consisted of the establishment, mobilization, or combat organization, which provided a survey of all naval installations on land and sea, their local defenses, and tactical subordination—as well as of all combat material on hand or to be secured, increased, or reorganized by a specified date. All operations envisaged by the military command were based on this Combat Organization Plan, and it also served the political leaders as an indication of the possibilities according to the strength and number of the military resources available.
“The Combat Organization Plan always had to be prepared with great foresight and was issued by the High Command of the Navy generally 1½ years before it was to go into effect, in order to enable the responsible offices to attend in time to such necessary preliminaries, such as applying to the Navy Budget Office for funds and materials—such as iron, steel, et cetera—and for the preparation of accommodation insofar as all this was not already covered by the peacetime development of the Navy.
“In 1933, when Hitler in his Five Year Plan demanded that by 1 April 1938 an armed force should be created which he could throw into the balance as an instrument of political power, the Combat Organization Plan for 1938 was worked out independently of the scheduled yearly Combat Organization Plan, and up to 1935 it dealt mostly with the possibilities of the Treaty of Versailles which had not yet been exhausted and with the question of supplementing the naval strength with craft not subject to limitation in type or number. After the Naval Pact of 1935, the Combat Organization Plan 1938 was replaced by a “Combat Organization Plan Ultimate Goal” (K.G. Endziel), which regulated the number of warships of all types existing or to be built in the proportion of 35:100 measured by the tonnage actually existing in the English Fleet. In consideration of monetary and material resources, the capacity of the shipyards, and the length of time required to build large warships, this ultimate goal was in the meanwhile fixed for the year 1944-45.
“There remained always the possibility of postponing it further, in accordance with the building program of the English Fleet.
“The various terminologies have only a naval technical significance and do not permit conclusions as to political plans.”
I would like to indicate a slight error in translation in the English text. The translation of the word “Terminierungen” by “terminology” is, in my opinion, not correct. It should probably be “dates” or “deadlines.”
Witness, are Vice Admiral Lohmann’s statements correct? Can you add anything to this basic point of view?