MAJOR JONES: At any rate, the Defendant Raeder took no steps to correct the information that had been passed to the American diplomatic representatives, did he?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I do not recall at all that Admiral Raeder advised me or the Foreign Office of the fact.
MAJOR JONES: Now, with regard to the Defendant Von Neurath.
If it please the Tribunal, I am not proposing to question the witness as to the earlier diplomatic history, as this Tribunal has indicated that it is desirable to reserve the matter for the defendants as they go into the witness box later.
[Turning to the witness.] But I want to ask you a general question. What was the earliest date at which responsible officials of the Foreign Office, like yourself, first realized that Hitler intended to wage aggressive war?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: That the foreign policy of Hitler’s Government was a dangerous one I realized clearly for the first time in May 1933; the fact that an aggressive war was planned, perhaps, in the summer of 1938, or at least that the course pursued in foreign policy might very easily lead to war.
MAJOR JONES: Already in April 1938, the foreign political situation was so tense that you sent a special memorandum to all German diplomatic representatives dealing with the situation—the critical situation of Germany.
VON WEIZSÄCKER: That may be. May I be permitted to read the document?
MAJOR JONES: I want you to look at Document Number 3572-PS, which is a memorandum of the 25th of April 1938, signed by yourself, and a copy of which was sent to all the German diplomatic representatives. It will be Exhibit GB-478. That document reads:
“Since the work in the field of preparation for the mobilization has made further progress within Germany in the Armed Forces and in all civil administrations including the Foreign Office, it is necessary now that in the case of government offices abroad corresponding measures also be taken in their area of jurisdiction without delay.”