DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, with regard to the minutes which I have shown you, I have one final question: Did you personally, as Chief of Staff, also receive and read all minutes which were sent to Raeder?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, as a rule I saw all minutes and reports before they were given to Raeder.
DR. SIEMERS: Was Admiral Reader of the opinion—excuse me, I should like to put the question differently.
What was Raeder’s point of view concerning the Navy and politics?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder’s opinion was that we, the Navy, had nothing to do with politics. He adopted that attitude as an order and a trust received from the old Reich President, Von Hindenburg, who, when appointing Raeder to be head of the Navy, imposed that as a duty upon him.
DR. SIEMERS: I now come to Norway. What were the reasons which induced Raeder, in September and October 1939, to consider a possible occupation of Norway?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The reasons were the reports which came from various sources about alleged intentions of an occupation of Norway by the Allies. These reports came from the following sources: First, Admiral Canaris, who was the chief of our intelligence service. He reported to Raeder, in my presence, once a week, the information that had come in. Secondly, the reports that came from the naval attaché in Oslo, Korvettenkapitän Schreiber, which indicated that rumors were increasing that the Allies intended to drag Scandinavia into the war in order to prevent, if possible, the iron ore exports from Sweden to Germany. We did not consider these reports altogether impossible, because, as documentary evidence from the last World War proves, Churchill had seriously considered the occupation of Norway.
DR. SIEMERS: Was there a further source for reports of that kind?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Admiral Carls, the Commander-in-Chief of Group North, had received similar reports which he passed on orally and in writing.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you remember any details from these reports which you could give us quite briefly?