DR. SIEMERS: What did Raeder do when Quisling confirmed the reports received from Canaris and other sources?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: As the things we suspected were confirmed from Norway, Raeder considered this so serious that he went immediately to Hitler.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you also know what he suggested to Hitler?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Hitler wanted to talk to Quisling himself.
DR. SIEMERS: And that took place?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, it did.
DR. SIEMERS: Was a final decision made then concerning Norway, in December 1939?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, Hitler directed that as a countermeasure, theoretical preparations should be made for a German landing in Norway. The order, the final order, as far as I know was not given until March.
DR. SIEMERS: Was the landing in Norway an undertaking which you and Raeder considered a risky one or was it considered absolutely safe to do so?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, Raeder and the gentlemen from the Naval Operations Staff and also the front commanders considered that undertaking very risky. I remember Churchill’s speech in Parliament when he said, after he had been questioned about that matter, that he did not believe the German Navy would undertake that risk in face of the British Navy.