“There is no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with the decision to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity. We cannot expect a repetition of the Czechoslovakian affair. There will be war.”
Then further, Page 76 of the report:
“The Führer doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement with England. We must prepare ourselves for the conflict... England is therefore our enemy, and the conflict with England will be a life and death struggle.”
And then the next paragraph but one:
“The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed force. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored.”
Now, I am suggesting to you that those statements of Hitler’s represented Hitler’s considered policy, and that that policy was in fact carried out in the field of action. Is that not so?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: First of all, I must correct a mistake. I thought that you had shown me a record on Russia and not the one on Poland. I saw it in different writing, and I thought it was another record. If it is the same record which I mentioned this morning, then I must state again that Raeder did not agree with the belligerent wording of these minutes as written down by Schmundt.
MAJOR JONES: Just one moment, Witness, if you please. I have read out certain extracts from that document, which I take it that you heard interpreted. Do you agree with me that those extracts represented Hitler’s considered policy at the time and that that policy was in fact carried out in the field of action?
If you keep your headphones on—I know it is difficult. Just move them back if you wish to talk. Now, see if you can answer my question.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I should like to remark in this connection that Hitler in his speeches pursued a certain purpose. In preparations for war he saw a means of political pressure, and in the phrase “war of nerves” (which was not used in Germany only, but went everywhere through the ether far beyond Europe’s boundaries) he tried to find a means of preventing war as well as a means of exerting pressure. This document itself contains contradictions which lead to the conclusion that he himself could not seriously have thought that a war would develop. I can prove this by saying, for example, that he states that the General Staff or the general staffs are not to concern themselves with this question; but toward the end he says that all the branches of the Wehrmacht must get together to study the problem. He says that a war with Poland must in no event result in war with England; politics must see to that. But in the next paragraph one reads: “But if a war actually does arise, I shall deal short sharp blows for a quick decision.” In the next paragraph it says again, “But I need 10 to 15 years to prepare,” and in the concluding paragraph it says: “The construction program of the Navy will in no wise be changed.”