And then finally:
“What decisive advantages would there be for the conduct of the war at sea in gaining a base in North Denmark, for instance, Skagen?”
Now, I suggest to you that those documents are the clue to the German invasion of Norway. Do you not agree with that?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I do not see any aggressive intentions in these purely operational plans and considerations when thinking of what bases might come into consideration for the conduct of the war. This morning I said that, to the best of my knowledge, Generaladmiral Carls as early as September sent a letter to this effect to Raeder in which he expressed his concern and stated his strategical ideas and plans in case of an Allied occupation of Norway.
MAJOR JONES: The source of the information which the Defendant Raeder was receiving you discussed this morning, but one source that you did not give wets the Norwegian traitor Quisling. The relations between the Defendant Raeder and him were very close, were they not?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: There was no contact at all between Raeder and Quisling until December 1939; then Raeder met Quisling for the first time in his life and never saw him again.
MAJOR JONES: But after December Quisling’s agent Hagelin was a very frequent visitor of the Defendant Raeder, was he not?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I do not believe that Hagelin ever went to Raeder before Quisling’s visit, unless I am very mistaken. I think he visited Raeder for the first time when he accompanied Quisling.
MAJOR JONES: Yes, but thereafter Raeder was in very close touch with the Quisling movement, the Quisling treachery, was he not?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. Raeder had nothing at all to do with the Quisling movement.