Assuming that signal reached you before 8 December, you became familiar with the plans of the perfidious Japanese attack upon the United States, did you not?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I do not quite grasp it. I have already said that we had no contact with the Japanese experts or attachés in Berlin. I asserted that we first learned of the Pearl Harbor incident by radio, and I cannot quite see what difference it makes whether on 6 December the attaché in Tokyo told us his predictions, or whether he was drawing conclusions about a future conflict from information sources which we could not control. That has nothing to do with our having advised the Japanese in Berlin to attack America.
MAJOR JONES: Are you saying that you had no conversations in Berlin with the Japanese attaché?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: To my knowledge there were no official conferences between the two admiralty staffs, that is, official operational conferences between the Naval Operations Staff and the Japanese admiralty staff.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Elwyn Jones, before you part from that document, I think you ought to read Paragraph 5.
MAJOR JONES: Paragraph 5, My Lord, reads:
“5. Addition—Naval Attaché.
“No exact details are available as to the zero hour for the commencement of the southern offensive. All the evidence, however, indicates that it may be expected to start within 3 weeks, with simultaneous attacks on Siam, the Philippines and Borneo.
“6. The Ambassador has no knowledge of the transmission of the telegram, but is acquainted with its contents.”
Now I want to...