I maintained this point of view when reporting to Hitler. In that report I first mentioned the intelligence reports which we had at hand. Then I described the dangers which might result to us from a British occupation of bases on the Norwegian coast and might affect our entire warfare, dangers which I considered tremendous. I had the feeling that such an occupation would gravely prejudice and imperil the whole conduct of our war.
If the British occupied bases in Norway, especially in the South of Norway, they would be able to dominate the entrance to the Baltic Sea from those points, and also flank our naval operations from the Helgoland Bight and from the Elbe, Jade and Weser. The second outlet which we had was also gravely imperiled, affecting the operations of battleships as well as the courses of our merchantmen.
In addition to that, from their air bases in Norway, they might endanger our air operations, the operations of our pilots for reconnaissance in the North Sea or for attacks against England.
Furthermore, from Norway they could exert strong pressure on Sweden, and that pressure would have been felt in this respect, that the supplies of ore from Sweden would have been hindered or stopped by purely political pressure. Finally, the export of ore from Narvik to Germany could have been stopped entirely, and it is known how much Germany depended on supplies of ore from Sweden and Norway. They might even have gone so far—and we learned about this subsequently that such plans were discussed—as to attack and destroy the ore deposits at Lulea, or to seize them.
All of these dangers might become decisive factors in the outcome of the war. Aside from the fact that I told Hitler that the best thing for us would be to have strict neutrality on the part of Norway, I also called his attention to the dangers which would result to us from an occupation of the Norwegian coast and Norwegian bases, for there would have been lively naval operations near the Norwegian coast in which the British, even after our occupation of bases, would try to hamper our ore traffic from Narvik. A struggle might ensue which we, with our inadequate supply of surface vessels, would be unable to cope with in the long run.
Therefore, at that time I did not make any proposal that we should occupy Norway or that we should obtain bases in Norway. I only did my duty in telling the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht about this grave danger which was threatening us, and against which we might have to use emergency measures for our defense. I also pointed out to him that possible operations for the occupation of Norwegian bases might be very expensive for us. In the course of later discussions I told him that we might even lose our entire fleet. I would consider it a favorable case if we were to lose only one-third, something which actually did happen later on.
There was, therefore, no reason for me to expect that I would gain prestige by such an enterprise—I have been accused of this ambition by the Prosecution. As a matter of fact, the exact opposite might easily result.
DR. SIEMERS: I should like to call the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that these things may be seen in documents which date from the time of the war, one of which is Exhibit Number Raeder-69, of 13 January 1940, which has just been handed over. This document is a study, and it is claimed that this study is based on the consideration that if England were to have the bases in Norway, the situation would be impossible for the conduct of the war by Germany and such a situation could be prevented only if we forestalled England by occupying Norway ourselves. What the witness has just said is stated in exactly the same way in the War Diary.
In the same connection, I should like to refer to the document of the Prosecution, Document C-66, GB-81, which may be found in British Document Book 10a, Page 35. This document is dated 10 January 1944. May I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the fact that there, under the code name “Weserübung” (Weser Maneuver)—that was the name covering this action—the substance of the statements the witness has just made is to be found. I do not wish to read all of them since we would lose valuable time thereby.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean C-66? That is about the Plan Barbarossa. Is that the one you mean?