DR. SIEMERS: Did you ask Hitler specifically to dismiss Terboven?
RAEDER: Several times. And I suggested that he should appoint General Admiral Böhm as commander of the armed forces for Norway and give him far-reaching powers so that he could carry out his—Hitler’s—aims. I suggested that the Führer should as soon as possible conclude a peace with Norway because only in that way could he bring about co-operation between Norway and Germany and make the population turn to him. I told him the attempts of sabotage by the Norwegian emigrants would lose their meaning and cease and that possibly the Norwegian emigrants who were leaning toward England at that time could be induced to return, because they might be afraid that they might “miss the bus”; especially from the point of view of economic advantages. The task of defending Norway would be considerably easier if a state of peace could be brought about.
DR. SIEMERS: In conclusion, may I refer to Exhibit Raeder-107 which is already known to the Tribunal. It is the affidavit by Schreiber under Roman Numeral II. There Schreiber has mentioned in detail the utmost endeavors of the Navy to prevent the regrettable terror regime of Terboven and explained that Raeder, for the last time in 1942, used all his efforts to get Hitler to conclude a peace between Norway and Germany. I believe that the Navy had a good reputation in Norway, that I can assume this is historically known without my having to prove it. To be on the safe side I applied for a witness, but consent was not given.
May I also submit Exhibit Raeder-108 (Document Raeder-108), Document Book 6, Page 473, a letter from Raeder to Admiral Böhm of 23 October 1942. Raeder writes:
“To my regret I have to send you enclosed, for your personal information, a letter from Reich Minister Dr. Lammers to Prime Minister Quisling.”
On Page 476 there is the letter from Lammers to Quisling which says—I quote only one sentence:
“The Führer, therefore, desires that during the war there shall be no conferences or discussions concerning a final or a preliminary peace between the Greater German Reich and Norway, or concerning other measures fixing or anticipating Norway’s position to the Reich after the end of the war.”
This is the letter which the witness mentioned, which finally brought to nought all his endeavors and those of Admiral Böhm.
Admiral, you had little to do with France, and therefore we can be very brief. May I merely ask you, did you attempt at any time to influence the political relations between Germany and France?
RAEDER: This influence, when there was any, was in the first place directed as much as possible towards improving the defense of the country. In the second place, there were above all humanitarian reasons. I often visited naval and submarine bases in France. During these journeys I got some knowledge of conditions in France. I saw that in 1940 and still in 1941 the population lived just as if it were at peace, completely undisturbed. Consequently I believed, since the Führer had shown so much moderation on the occasion of the Armistice, that a basis could be found which would draw France—whose government was after all collaborationist—closer to us.