JODL: I had been told that the purpose was to exert a certain amount of pressure so that Schuschnigg, when he had returned home, would adhere to the agreement made at Obersalzberg.
DR. EXNER: How long before the actual entry into Austria did you know of such intentions?
JODL: On 10 March in the morning just before 11 o’clock I heard of it for the first time.
DR. EXNER: And the entry took place when?
JODL: On the 12th. It was when General Keitel and General Viehbahn, who was then temporarily Chief of Armed Forces Operations Staff, were suddenly ordered to the Reich Chancellery that I heard of the intention for the first time.
DR. EXNER: Then did you have a plan made, or what?
JODL: The Führer surprised them by stating that the question involved was the Austrian problem; and then they remembered, that there was a General Staff plan called “Otto.” They sent for me and for the directive, and learned from me that such a directive actually did exist, but that in practice nothing at all had been prepared. As it had only been a theoretical plan and drafted solely in the event of an Austrian restoration, and as such a restoration was not expected for the moment, the High Command of the Army had virtually done nothing about it.
DR. EXNER: How did you yourself understand the entire Austrian action?
JODL: It appeared to me to be a family squabble which Austria herself would solve through her domestic politics in a very short time.
DR. EXNER: And what made you think that?